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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(i) 
A class action may be certified only if the four pre-
requisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) 
are satisfied (numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and fair-and-adequate representation), and the class 
action falls within one of Rule 23(b)’s defined types.  
The third subpart of Rule 23(b) is at issue here, and 
it allows certification only if “the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only  
individual members, and that a class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for fairly and effi-
ciently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3).  In addition, class certification “shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right” 
under the Rules Enabling Act.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
This case presents two questions about these re-
quirements.  They are: 
1.  Whether individual damage calculations alone 
can overwhelm questions common to the class, pre-
cluding certification under Rule 23(b)(3). 
2.  Whether plaintiffs may use a formula that relies 
on a uniform measure of harm derived from the av-
erage experience of all class members as common 
proof of damages. 
 
ii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
 
1.  Google Inc., petitioner on review, was defend-
ant-appellee below. 
2.  Pulaski & Middleman, LLC; JIT Packaging, 
Inc.; RK West, Inc.; and Richard Oesterling, re-
spondents on review, were plaintiffs-appellants be-
low. 
 
iii 
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alpha-
bet Inc., a publicly traded company.  No other com-
pany owns 10% or more of Google’s stock. 
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 (1) 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
_________ 
No. 15- 
_________ 
GOOGLE INC., 
  Petitioner, 
v. 
 
PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC, et al., 
  Respondents. 
_________ 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit 
_________ 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
_________ 
Petitioner Google Inc. respectfully petitions for a 
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit is reported at 802 
F.3d 979.  Pet. App. 1a-21a.  Its orders denying re-
hearing en banc, Pet. App. 66a-67a, and staying its 
mandate pending the filing of this certiorari petition, 
Pet. App. 65a, are unreported.  The opinion of the 
United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California denying class certification is not 
published in the Federal Supplement, but is availa-
ble at 2012 WL 28068.  Pet. App. 22a-59a. 
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JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was entered on 
September 21, 2015, and a timely petition for rehear-
ing was denied on December 8, 2015.  Pet. App. 66a-
67a.  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1). 
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED 
This case involves the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072, and Federal Rule of Procedure 23, 
which are reproduced at Pet. App. 68a-76a. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a case where the Ninth Circuit has imper-
missibly diluted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s 
rigorous requirements for certification of class ac-
tions.  The court of appeals reversed the district 
court’s refusal to certify a class of Google advertisers 
claiming violations of California’s unfair-competition 
laws.  Its decision departs from the fundamental 
principles of class certification that this Court laid 
down in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011), and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. 
Ct. 1426 (2013), joining and creating circuit splits in 
the process.  Google respectfully asks the Court to 
grant review and reverse. 
The first question presented concerns Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.  To meet that 
requirement, a plaintiff must show that “questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  In many cases, alt-
hough common questions of liability exist, there are 
nonetheless individual questions of damages.  So the 
question frequently arises:  Can individual damage 
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calculations alone overwhelm questions common to 
the class, defeating certification under Rule 23(b)(3)? 
The courts of appeals are divided.  Five circuits—
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Cir-
cuits—have answered yes:  Individual damage calcu-
lations alone can defeat certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).  By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in this case 
answered no:  Individual damage calculations alone 
cannot defeat certification.  That decision flies in the 
face of this Court’s decision in Comcast, which held 
that “individual damage calculations” not simply 
can, but sometimes “will,” “overwhelm questions 
common to the class.”  133 S. Ct. at 1433 (emphasis 
added).  Because this important and recurring issue 
has divided the circuits, and because the Ninth Cir-
cuit plainly erred, this Court should agree to decide 
the first question presented. 
The second question presented challenges the 
Ninth Circuit’s embrace of a general, one-size-fits-all 
formula to resolve damages for the whole class.  The 
court of appeals approved the formula because it did 
“not turn on individual circumstances.”  Pet. 
App. 21a.  But that, of course, is precisely the prob-
lem.  This Court has expressly “disapprove[d]” just 
that “novel project” of computing class damages by a 
formula “without further individualized proceed-
ings.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.  Wal-Mart’s 
holding on that point directly follows from the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 et seq., which “forbids 
interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.’ ”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2561 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).  “Trial by Formu-
la” forecloses individual defenses and sets damages 
for plaintiffs at amounts divorced from their particu-
lar circumstances, thereby giving plaintiffs greater 
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substantive rights than they would have in individu-
al proceedings.  Id. 
Consistent with the Rules Enabling Act, the Sec-
ond, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all 
held that damages in class actions cannot be com-
puted using an “abstract analysis of ‘averages.’ ”  
E.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, 
Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 1998).  The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision erroneously joins the minority view 
of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, contrary to Wal-
Mart’s instruction.  The cert-worthiness of this ques-
tion is already established; it is currently pending 
before the Court in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 
135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015) (granting review of Eighth 
Circuit decision).  See Pet. at i, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Mar. 19, 2015), 2015 WL 
1285369 (first question presented). 
In short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision “conflicts 
with” Comcast and Wal-Mart, and it creates and 
deepens divisions among the circuits regarding class-
certification standards.  It threatens to turn the 
Ninth Circuit into a class-action magnet.  And, on 
the merits, this case should not proceed as a class 
action; the court of appeals was only able to approve 
that course by bending the substantive law of resti-
tution to fit the needs of class adjudication and rob-
bing Google of its right to present defenses.  Proce-
dural rules are supposed to serve substantive law, 
not the other way around.  The decision below would 
result in an unwieldy class comprised of hundreds of 
thousands of different advertisers who purchased 
millions of different ads from Google over the course 
of several different years.  That entire class will de-
mand restitution from Google for alleged violations of 
California’s unfair competition laws—never mind 
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that some putative class members benefited from the 
alleged misconduct.  And it will do so by punching 
numbers into an abstract formula, even though—as 
the district court rightly found—determining the 
proper amount of restitution for each class member 
requires a “complex and highly individualized analy-
sis.”  Pet. App. 56a. 
This Court should grant review to bring the Ninth 
Circuit’s class-action jurisprudence in line with Com-
cast and Wal-Mart, and to resolve the multiple con-
flicts among the courts of appeals. 
STATEMENT 
A. Factual Background 
Google AdWords is an online advertising service.  
During the class period, AdWords allowed advertis-
ers to place ads alongside Google search results or on 
other webpages that were part of Google’s advertis-
ing network.  Pet. App. 23a.  The ads generally were 
matched to Internet users based on the search que-
ries the users entered on Google (or other search en-
gines) or the subject-matter of the websites they 
viewed.  Pet. App. 5a-6a.  The ads typically were 
short strings of text with hyperlinks that, when 
clicked, took the user to the advertiser’s website.  Id.  
Advertisers paid Google each time an Internet user 
clicked on an advertisement link.  Pet. App. 5a. 
Plaintiffs in this suit all purchased advertising ser-
vices from Google AdWords.  They allege that Google 
misled them in violation of California law by showing 
their ads on two types of websites: “parked domains” 
and “error pages.”  Pet. App. 6a.  A “parked domain” 
is a webpage with a registered address that is rela-
tively undeveloped and consists primarily of ads or 
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links.  Id.  “Error pages” act as placeholders when a 
user enters an address that does not match a regis-
tered URL.  Id.  Google generally displayed ads on 
parked domains and error pages that were matched 
to terms the user entered into the address bar of a 
web browser, or searches a user made on the website, 
so the ads a user saw were typically relevant to what 
the user was looking for.  Pet. App. 5a-6a, 24a. 
B. Proceedings Below 
Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against 
Google under California’s Unfair Competition and 
Fair Advertising Laws.  They sought restitution for 
Google’s alleged failure to inform them that it would 
display their ads on two types of purportedly “low 
quality” sites: “parked domains” and “error pages.”  
Pet. App. 41a.  They moved to certify a class—for the 
purpose of establishing liability and damages—
which consisted of “[a]ll Google AdWords Customers 
who, during the [class period], were charged by 
Google for clicks on their advertisements that Google 
placed on parked domains or error pages.”  Pet. 
App. 38a (citation omitted). 
The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for certi-
fication of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.  The court found that 
there was a single common issue:  “whether Google’s 
alleged omissions were misleading to a reasonable 
AdWords customer.”  Pet. App. 51a.  But it was “un-
convinced” that “commonalities predominate.”  Pet. 
App. 54a.  The main obstacle was “the individual na-
ture of the restitutionary relief sought.”  Id.  Plain-
tiffs’ theory rested on “what AdWords customers 
would have paid ‘but for’ the alleged misstatements 
or omissions.”  Pet. App. 55a.  Yet, as the district 
court explained, “any effort to determine what adver-
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tisers ‘would have paid’ * * * requires a complex and 
highly individualized analysis of advertiser behavior 
for each particular ad that was placed.”  Pet. 
App. 56a. 
Plaintiffs had proposed three methods of calculat-
ing restitution, none of which sufficiently took into 
account the circumstances surrounding the AdWords 
auctions.  Pet. App. 57a.  Plaintiffs’ primary pro-
posal—which was the only one it defended on appeal, 
see CA9 Appellants’ Opening Br. 27-37; CA9 Appel-
lants’ Reply Br. 16-20—is called the “Smart Pricing 
Method.”  “Smart Pricing” refers to a discount that 
Google gives advertisers as a business accommoda-
tion in certain circumstances.  Pet. App. 57a.  It in-
volves looking at the aggregate performance of ads 
on a given webpage, and comparing it to the perfor-
mance of ads on a benchmark page like google.com.  
Pet. App. 57a, 62a-63a.  Performance is measured by 
a “conversion rate,” which is the rate at which a click 
on an ad link leads to a particular business result for 
the advertiser, like a purchase or a sign-up.  Pet. 
App. 5a & n.2.  Google uses Smart Pricing in certain 
contexts to discount the cost-per-click bid on a web-
site with lower performance.  Id. 
Plaintiffs sought to use that Smart Pricing discount 
as a way to measure restitution.  “The amount of res-
titution owed a class member would be the difference 
between the amount the advertiser actually paid and 
the amount paid reduced by the Smart Pricing dis-
count ratio.”  Pet. App. 7a.  As the district court ex-
plained, the “ ‘Smart Pricing Method’ would apply a 
uniform discount on all ads placed on a parked do-
main—even if an individual advertiser’s ads on that 
web page outperformed ads appearing on other types 
of websites.”  Pet. App. 57a.  Take one of the named 
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plaintiffs, RK West, as an example.  RK West had a 
higher conversion rate on parked domains than on 
the benchmark site.  Id.  In other words, RK West 
benefited from Google’s practice because its perfor-
mance was better on parked domains.  Because of 
this, the district court correctly concluded that “ap-
plying a uniform discount” to all putative class mem-
bers, regardless of their circumstances, was “too in-
exact a solution.”  Pet. App. 63a.  It held that “indi-
vidualized issues of restitution permeate the class 
claims,” and “the proposed class is not ‘sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ ”  
Pet. App. 58a-59a (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)); see also Pet. 
App. 60a-64a (denying petition for reconsideration). 
A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding 
that the predominance requirement was satisfied.  In 
reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals first 
held that there were no individual questions regard-
ing “entitlement to restitution.”  Pet. App. 14a (em-
phasis added).  The court thus perceived no individ-
ual issues of liability.  See Pet. App. 11a-14a.  The 
court then held that any differences in calculating 
the amount of restitution could not predominate.  
That is because, the court declared, “damage calcula-
tions alone cannot defeat certification.”  Pet. 
App. 14a (citation omitted).  Applying that categori-
cal rule, the court did not even consider whether, in 
the particular circumstances of this case, there were 
any individual issues of damages—much less wheth-
er those issues overwhelmed questions common to 
the class.  Finally, the court found that a simple for-
mula based on the Smart Pricing Method was an ac-
ceptable way to measure restitution for class mem-
bers.  Pet. App. 21a.  “Because restitution * * * 
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measures what the advertiser would have paid at the 
outset, rather than accounting for what occurred af-
ter the purchase, using a ratio from Google’s data 
that adjusts for web page quality is both targeted to 
remedying the alleged harm and does not turn on in-
dividual circumstances.”  Id.  The panel therefore re-
versed the district court’s decision and remanded. 
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, 
Pet. App. 66a-67a, but upon Google’s motion and 
over Plaintiffs’ objection, the court of appeals stayed 
its mandate pending the filing of this certiorari peti-
tion.  Pet. App. 65a. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW  
TO DECIDE WHETHER INDIVIDUAL 
DAMAGE CALCULATIONS ALONE CAN 
OVERWHELM QUESTIONS COMMON TO 
THE CLASS. 
The first question presented concerns Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s predominance require-
ment; it asks whether individual damage calcula-
tions alone can overwhelm questions common to the 
class, precluding certification.  This recurring and 
important question of class-action procedure has di-
vided the federal courts of appeals.  And the Ninth 
Circuit’s resolution of that question in this case was 
plainly wrong.  Accordingly, this Court should grant 
certiorari and reverse. 
A. This Important And Recurring Ques-
tion Has Divided The Circuits. 
Review is warranted to resolve a clean split over a 
fundamental issue:  Whether individual damage cal-
10 
 
culations alone can overwhelm questions common to 
the class, defeating certification under Rule 23(b)(3). 
1.  Five courts of appeals—the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—have answered yes:  
Individual damage calculations alone can defeat 
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). 
As the Third Circuit has held, “there are cases 
where the question of damages is so central that it 
can, in some sense, overtake the question of liabil-
ity.”  Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir. 
2004), abrogated on other grounds by In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 n.18 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  That ruling remains the law in the Third 
Circuit.  As one district court explained, the relevant 
inquiry is “whether the individual proofs of damages 
predominate over the common liability issues * * * —
that is, whether this is []one of those cases [‘]where 
the question of damages is so central that it can, in 
some sense, overtake the question of liability.’ ”  
Johnson v. GEICO Cas. Co., 310 F.R.D. 246, 255 (D. 
Del. 2015) (quoting Chiang, 385 F.3d at 273).  John-
son involved a putative class of insureds who brought 
suit against their automobile insurer.  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the insurer engaged in bad faith and 
consumer fraud by using arbitrary rules to deter-
mine whether to pay personal injury protection bene-
fits.  Id. at 248.  The district court originally granted 
Rule 23(b)(3) class certification, but later decertified 
the class because it concluded individual damages 
issues predominated.  Id. at 254-256.  The court ex-
plained:  “Although there are common questions of 
law and fact as to the substantive liability of [the in-
surers] for their allegedly deficient processes and 
misrepresentations, these common questions would 
consume much less litigation time than the proof of 
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damages for each individual class member.”  Id. at 
255.  Accordingly, although “[t]he individualized de-
terminations with respect to the relief to be granted 
do not undermine Rule 23(a) commonality as to lia-
bility issues,” they “predominate over them under 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s more demanding standard.”  Id. 
The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in 
Lienhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th 
Cir. 2001).  In that case, a putative class of home-
owners sued a manufacturer for negligently design-
ing a home siding product.  Id. at 141.  The district 
court certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class, but the Fourth 
Circuit vacated that ruling.  Id. at 151.  The court of 
appeals explained that the “functional equivalent of 
a full-blown trial on damages causation for each pu-
tative class member would be required.”  Id. at 149.  
And according to the court, that need alone—the 
need for “individualized proof of damages”—
“destroy[ed] predominance.”  Id. at 149; see also 
Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 924 (4th Cir. 
2015) (citing Comcast as “explaining that individual 
damage-related questions might destroy predomi-
nance”); Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 
164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (“individualized damage de-
terminations cut against class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3)”); Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 
565 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the 
“damage aspect of [a] case predominate[s]” where 
“the issue of damages * * * requires separate mini-
trials” (brackets and citations omitted)); Martin v. 
Mountain State Univ., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-03937, 2014 
WL 1333251, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2014) (“the 
varied and diverse circumstances of the proposed 
class members indicates that individualized proof of 
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damages and causation will be required; such indi-
vidualized proof defeats predominance”). 
The decisions of the Fifth Circuit are to the same 
effect.  For example, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 339 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 2003), a putative class 
of plaintiffs sued AT&T for monopolizing the market 
for caller-ID service.  Id. at 297.  In affirming the de-
nial of class certification, the court of appeals held 
that the plaintiffs’ motion “founder[ed] on the issue 
of the amount of damages.”  Id. at 303.  As the court 
explained, “any adequate estimation of actual dam-
ages” would require “individualized inquiries.”  Id. at 
304.  And given the need for “the calculation of indi-
vidualized actual economic damages,” the court held 
that the predominance requirement could not be sat-
isfied.  Id. at 308; see also id. at 304 (“In light of the 
need for such individualized inquiries, we cannot 
conclude that the plaintiffs have established that the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be satisfied in the 
present case.”).  Numerous other Fifth Circuit deci-
sions have denied Rule 23(b)(3) certification on the 
same basis: the need for individual damage calcula-
tions alone.  See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
“individual issues of medical causation and damages” 
predominate); O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 744 (5th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that “individualized calculations of damages pre-
dominate”); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 
F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that “individu-
al-specific issues relating to the plaintiffs’ claims for 
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compensatory and punitive damages” predominate).1  
And district courts within the Fifth Circuit continue 
to apply the same rule today.  See, e.g., St. Gregory 
Cathedral Sch. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 6:12-CV-739, 
2015 WL 5604763, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015) 
(denying class certification in part because of Steer-
ing Committee; holding that “calculating damages 
will require individual inquiries that will also pre-
dominate over any common issues that may be pre-
sented by this case”); Simms v. Jones, 296 F.R.D. 
485, 504-505, 507-508 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (denying 
class certification based on Bell Atlantic), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-10242 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2015); Ha-
ley v. Merial, Ltd., 292 F.R.D. 339, 360 (N.D. Miss. 
2013) (“The Fifth Circuit has held that the necessity 
of calculating damages on an individual basis, by it-
self, can be grounds for not certifying a class.”). 
The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement.  In Sacred 
Heart Health Systems, Inc. v. Humana Military 
Healthcare Services, Inc., 601 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 
2010), a putative class of hospitals sued a health 
maintenance organization (HMO), alleging that the 
                                                   
1 In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014), addressed a slightly different issue.  
The court there explained that the absence of “a formula for 
classwide measurement of damages” will not defeat certification 
in a case where “predominance [i]s based not on common issues 
of damages but on the numerous common issues of liability.”  
Id. at 815.  In other words, the court held that individualized 
damage issues do not always defeat predominance; it did not 
hold that individualized damages can never predominate.  Ra-
ther, the Fifth Circuit simply affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that “even without a common means of measuring damages 
* * * common issues nonetheless predominated over the issues 
unique to individual claimants.”  Id. at 816. 
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HMO “systematically underpaid them for medical 
services.”  Id. at 1164.  The HMO argued that the 
predominance requirement could not be satisfied in 
light of its affirmative defenses.  See id. at 1177-1178 
(citation omitted).  The district court, however, “min-
imized the impact of [those] defenses on the outcome 
of the predominance inquiry, stating that the defens-
es ‘largely involve individualized damages issues, not 
liability issues.’ ”  Id. at 1178.  On appeal, the court of 
appeals reversed the certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class, “find[ing] no support in the text of Rule 23 or 
interpretive case law for the district court’s rigid dis-
tinction between liability and damages.”  Id.  Even 
when the individual issues involve damages, the 
court explained, the “relevant inquiry” is still the 
same: “whether common issues predominate over in-
dividual ones.”  Id. at 1179.  The Eleventh Circuit 
therefore held that it was “clear error” for the district 
court to “brush [the HMO’s defenses] aside as mere 
‘damages’ issues.”  Id.  The upshot is that individual 
issues can defeat predominance, even when they in-
volve damages.  The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed 
that principle in Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 
F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2012), upholding the district 
court’s conclusion that “variation in individual dam-
ages render[ed] the class unsuitable for certification 
on predominance grounds.”  Id. at 1308. 
The D.C. Circuit is in the same camp.  In In re Rail 
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 725 F.3d 
244 (D.C. Cir. 2013), a putative class of shippers 
sued a group of freight railroad companies, alleging 
antitrust violations.  Id. at 247.  The court of appeals 
held that the plaintiffs could meet the predominance 
requirement only if they could “offer common evi-
dence of classwide injury.”  Id. at 253.  As the court 
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put it:  “No damages model, no predominance, no 
class certification.”  Id.  In other words, without an 
adequate classwide damages model, individualized 
damages questions alone would defeat predominance 
and class certification.  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit 
vacated certification of the class and ordered the dis-
trict court to reconsider the adequacy of the plain-
tiffs’ damages model.  Id. at 255.2 
2.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case con-
flicts with the decisions of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.  As explained above, 
each of those five circuits has held that individual 
damage calculations alone can overwhelm questions 
common to the class.  The Ninth Circuit, our nation’s 
largest, has now reached the opposite conclusion, 
holding in this case that “damage calculations alone 
cannot defeat certification.”  Pet. App. 14a (emphasis 
added; citation omitted); see also Pet. App. 17a 
(“[D]ifferences in damage calculations do not defeat 
class certification * * * .”).  Thus, while courts in oth-
er circuits would have asked (1) whether there were 
any individual issues of damages and (2) whether 
those issues overwhelmed any questions common to 
the class, the Ninth Circuit in this case did neither.  
Instead, having concluded that there were no indi-
vidual issues of liability, see Pet. App. 11a-14a, the 
Ninth Circuit held that it was simply irrelevant 
whether there were any individual issues of damag-
                                                   
2 The Tenth Circuit also has generally aligned with the major-
ity view.  See Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. 
XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that “material differences in damages determinations” 
that “require individualized inquiries” may “destroy[]” predom-
inance). 
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es, see Pet. App. 14a-18a.  That categorical holding—
that individual damage calculations alone cannot de-
feat certification under Rule 23(b)(3), see Pet. 
App. 14a, 17a, 18a—cannot be reconciled with the 
decisions of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits. 
3.  The time is now to resolve this circuit split.  The 
Ninth Circuit, which denied rehearing en banc in 
this case, has given no indication of changing its in-
terpretation of Rule 23(b)(3).3  And as long as the de-
cision below is permitted to stand, plaintiffs across 
the country will elect to file their putative class ac-
tions in the Ninth Circuit, where they know they can 
satisfy the predominance requirement regardless of 
the individual damages they seek.  See Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 729, 823 (2013) (explaining that plaintiffs may 
choose to file in “circuits that are most receptive to 
class actions”).  Indeed, district courts in that circuit 
have already begun relying on the decision below—
and its categorical rule regarding individual damage 
calculations—in allowing suits to proceed as Rule 
23(b)(3) classes.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Open Top 
Sightseeing S.F., LLC, No. 14-cv-852, 2015 WL 
9304041, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015); O’Connor v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826, 2015 WL 
8292006, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-17420 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2015). 
                                                   
3 As previously mentioned, supra p. 9, the Ninth Circuit did, 
however, stay its mandate pending the filing of a certiorari pe-
tition in this case.  The standard for such a stay is “that the cer-
tiorari petition would present a substantial question and that 
there is good cause for a stay.”  Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(A). 
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The practical consequences of this split are there-
fore sweeping.  More plaintiffs will file their class ac-
tions in the Ninth Circuit, where more motions for 
class certification will be granted—despite the pres-
ence of individual damage questions that would lead 
those very cases to be denied certification in other 
circuits.  And those class-certification orders will 
likely dictate the outcome of many of those cases, 
“set[ting] the litigation on a path toward resolution 
by way of settlement, not full-fledged testing of the 
plaintiffs’ case by trial.”  Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 97, 99 (2009).  Indeed, by “increas[ing] the 
defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation 
costs,” class certification often forces a defendant to 
“abandon” even a “meritorious defense.”  Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).   
The question presented thus calls out for this 
Court’s review.  The circuits are squarely divided, 
and the question is important and recurring.  This 
Court should intervene now. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Is Con-
trary To Supreme Court Precedent. 
Review should be granted for an additional reason:  
The Ninth Circuit’s categorical rule that individual 
damage calculations alone can never predominate is 
wrong.  Indeed, it flatly contradicts this Court’s deci-
sion in Comcast, which held that “individual damage 
calculations” alone can—and in fact did in that 
case—“overwhelm questions common to the class.”  
133 S. Ct. at 1433. 
In Comcast, a putative class of cable-television sub-
scribers sued their cable provider for alleged anti-
trust violations.  Id. at 1430.  The plaintiffs proposed 
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four theories of antitrust liability, but the district 
court accepted only one—the so-called “overbuilder” 
theory—“as capable of classwide proof.”  Id. at 1431.  
The district court further found that the damages re-
sulting from that theory “could be calculated on a 
classwide basis,” using a model developed by the 
plaintiffs’ expert.  Id.  In light of that determination, 
the district court concluded that the proposed class 
met Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, and 
the Third Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 1430-1431. 
This Court reversed.  The Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ model failed to attribute damages to “any 
one particular theory” of liability.  Id. at 1434.  In-
stead, the Court explained, the model “assumed the 
validity of all four theories” advanced by the plain-
tiffs—not just the overbuilder theory, but also the 
three theories that had been rejected.  Id.  So while 
the plaintiffs had presented a classwide theory of li-
ability, they had failed to present a classwide method 
for measuring damages.  And the Court held that ab-
sent such a method, the plaintiffs “cannot show Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance:  Questions of individual 
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm ques-
tions common to the class.”  Id. at 1433.  Comcast 
thus holds that “individual damage calculations” 
alone can—and sometimes will—“overwhelm ques-
tions common to the class.”  Id. 
That makes sense.  After all, the text of Rule 
23(b)(3) does not distinguish between liability and 
damages.  See Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1178 (find-
ing “no support in the text of Rule 23” for a “rigid 
distinction between liability and damages”).  It does 
not say, for example, that class certification is ap-
propriate only if “questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions of li-
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ability affecting only individual members.”  Rather, 
under the plain text of the rule, “any questions af-
fecting only individual members” can overwhelm 
questions common to the class and thus defeat certi-
fication.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).  
Comcast’s holding therefore follows directly from the 
text of the rule itself:  Individual damage calcula-
tions—like any other “questions affecting only indi-
vidual members”—can defeat certification of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class. 
This is not to say that individual damage calcula-
tions will always overwhelm questions common to 
the class.  In certain circumstances, certification of a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class might be appropriate, notwith-
standing the presence of individual issues involving 
damages.  But for a court to make that determina-
tion, it would have to conduct the “rigorous analysis” 
that Rule 23 requires.  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 
(citation omitted).  The Ninth Circuit did not conduct 
that analysis here.  Instead of examining the particu-
lar circumstances of this case to determine whether 
“questions of liability to the class * * * predominate[] 
over * * * individual issues relating to damages,” Sa-
cred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1179 (brackets in original; 
citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit simply declared, 
as a categorical rule, that “damage calculations alone 
cannot defeat certification,” Pet. App. 14a (citation 
omitted).4 
                                                   
4 The Ninth Circuit cited Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 
F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2015), in support of its position.  See Pet. 
App. 17a-18a.  But Roach held that individualized damage cal-
culations do not always predominate, 778 F.3d at 408; it did not 
hold that individualized damage calculations can never predom-
inate.  The district court’s error in that case was that it “did not 
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That decision is contrary to the decisions of other 
circuits, this Court’s decision in Comcast, and the 
plain text of Rule 23(b)(3).  Accordingly, this Court 
should grant full-dress review to resolve the circuit 
split and correct the Ninth Circuit’s error.  In the al-
ternative, because the Ninth Circuit’s decision is so 
obviously wrong, this Court may wish to summarily 
reverse. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO 
DECIDE WHETHER PLAINTIFFS MAY USE 
FORMULAS BASED ON THE AVERAGE 
CLASS MEMBER’S EXPERIENCE AS 
COMMON PROOF OF DAMAGES. 
The second question presented addresses the Ninth 
Circuit’s approval of a formula-based approach to 
classwide restitutionary relief.  The court of appeals 
held that restitution could be determined for each 
class member using an averages-based formula that 
applied a uniform discount rate.  Pet. App. 20a-21a.  
It was enough that the rate was extrapolated “from 
Google’s data” and purported to serve as a uniform 
means to “adjust[] for web page quality.”  Pet. 
App. 21a.  That, according to the panel, was a suffi-
cient indicator of “the value of the service at the time 
of purchase,” which did “not turn on individual cir-
cumstances.”  Pet. App. 20a.  The question is wheth-
er plaintiffs may rely on a damages model that uses 
a uniform measure of harm, derived from the aver-
                                                                                                        
evaluate whether the individualized damages questions pre-
dominate over the common questions of liability”; instead, the 
court refused to certify the class “only because the district court 
concluded damages were not capable of measurement on a 
classwide basis.”  Id. at 408-409. 
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age experience of class members, as common evi-
dence of damages.  See Pet. App. 57a. 
A. The Courts Of Appeals Are Divided 
On The Propriety Of Averages-Based 
Class Damages Models. 
The courts of appeals are in conflict over the an-
swer to this question.  See Pet. 3, 15-21, 24, Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Mar. 19, 
2015), 2015 WL 1285369 (describing split among the 
courts of appeals on this issue).  The Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have answered no; plain-
tiffs may not resort to a statistical-averages-derived 
model to prove classwide monetary relief.  The court 
below joins the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in answer-
ing yes. 
1. The four-circuit majority rule is that models for 
classwide monetary relief cannot use averages to 
overcome individual calculation disparities.  For ex-
ample, in a state-unfair-competition-law case like 
this one, the Fourth Circuit disallowed the use of av-
erages-based evidence as a “shortcut” to prove class-
wide damages.  Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muf-
fler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 1998).  A 
class of franchisees alleged that their franchisor had 
not told them about the large commission rate for 
expenditures paid out of the franchisees’ collective 
advertising account.  Id. at 335.  The franchisees al-
leged that they had lost sales as a result of the misal-
located funds.  Id. at 336.  At trial, “[p]laintiffs’ ex-
pert outlined a damages formula, by which he pur-
ported to calculate the lost profits damages of all 
class members on a ‘global’ basis.”  Id.  He opined 
that the franchisees had all lost a uniform amount of 
sales with a uniform profit margin.  Id. 
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Like in this case, the plaintiffs’ recovery model was 
based “on abstract analysis of ‘averages’ ” such as 
“the average effect of ads on sales,” and “the average 
profit margin.”  Id. at 343.  Unlike the court below, 
however, the Fourth Circuit rejected this approach.  
It explained:  “That this shortcut was necessary in 
order for this suit to proceed as a class action should 
have been a caution signal to the district court that 
class-wide proof of damages was impermissible.”  Id.  
Because the class was improperly certified, the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment.  
Id. at 334. 
The Second Circuit follows suit.  McLaughlin v. 
American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008), 
abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008).  McLaugh-
lin was a case dealing with the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961 et seq., wherein smokers claimed they were 
deceived into believing that “light” cigarettes were 
healthier than regular cigarettes.  McLaughlin, 522 
F.3d at 220.  The district court allowed classwide 
damages to be calculated based on an “estimate of 
the percentage of class members who were defraud-
ed” and “an estimate of the average loss for each 
plaintiff.”  Id. at 231.  The Second Circuit reversed, 
soundly rejecting this approach as simply “mask[ing] 
the prevalence of individual issues.”  Id. at 232.  “[I]t 
offends both the Rules Enabling Act and the Due 
Process Clause” to allow classwide damages to be 
calculated in a manner “that does not accurately re-
flect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by de-
fendants and that bears little or no relationship to 
the amount of economic harm actually caused by de-
fendants.”  Id. at 231.  So too here; yet the Ninth Cir-
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cuit went ahead and approved the calculation any-
way. 
The Seventh Circuit, too, agrees with the majority 
rule.  In Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 
F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2013), that court of appeals re-
viewed the decertification of a class action brought 
under state wage-and-hour law (as well as a collec-
tive action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.).  Espenscheid, 705 F.3d 
at 771.  A putative class of satellite dish technicians 
brought suit against their employer for wage viola-
tions.  Id. at 772-773.  The plaintiffs argued that tes-
timony from 42 representative witnesses would “en-
able a rational determination of each class member’s 
damages.”  Id. at 776.  The court of appeals disa-
greed.  “Essentially they asked the district judge to 
embark on a shapeless, freewheeling trial that would 
combine liability and damages and would be virtual-
ly evidence-free so far as damages were concerned.”  
Id.  That prospect should sound familiar—it is exact-
ly what the Ninth Circuit approved in this case:  
Once a single class representative established liabil-
ity, recovery at the uniform discount rate followed.  
See Pet. App. 14a, 21a.  The Seventh Circuit rejected 
class certification using that same type of formula; 
the Ninth Circuit should have done the same. 
The Fifth Circuit rounds out the majority courts of 
appeals’ view.  That court has held that a class ac-
tion that paves over individual differences in service 
of class treatment violates the Rules Enabling Act, 
the Due Process Clause, and potentially the Seventh 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.  In re Fibreboard 
Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).  The district 
court in In re Fibreboard consolidated over 3,000 as-
bestos personal-injury cases for trial and directed 
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that “certain representative cases w[ould] be fully 
tried and the jury w[ould] decide the total, or ‘omni-
bus’ liability to the class.”  Id.  The Fifth Circuit took 
issue with this approach, explaining that the “ele-
ments of compensation” in products-liability cases 
“focus upon individuals, not groups.”  Id. at 711.  “To 
create the requisite commonality for trial, the dis-
crete components of the class members’ claims and 
the asbestos manufacturers’ defenses must be sub-
merged.”  Id. at 712.  Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision below, the Fifth Circuit recognized the “ena-
bling acts prevent” that strategy.  Id.  And it believed 
the issue important enough to grant mandamus, va-
cating the district court’s order directing a single 
damages trial.  Id. 
2. Three circuits, including the court below, have 
held differently.  The Eighth Circuit reached the is-
sue in a case where a class of poultry plant workers 
claimed that they were not paid for all time worked.  
Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th 
Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015).  The 
district court certified the class, and at trial, it al-
lowed the plaintiffs to use “average times calculated 
from a sample” as evidence of the time the class as a 
whole spent working on uncompensated activities.  
Id. at 799.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury ver-
dict for the plaintiffs.  It rejected the defendant’s ar-
gument that the district court had allowed a prohib-
ited “Trial by Formula.”  Id. at 798-799.  Instead, ac-
cording to the court, the plaintiffs’ averages-based 
calculations were “representative evidence” properly 
used to determine classwide damages.  Id. at 798.  
That decision is currently on review in this Court. 
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in an 
antitrust case.  In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 
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F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014), pet. for cert. pending, No. 
14-1091 (U.S. filed Mar. 9, 2015), joint motion to hold 
pet. in abeyance pending approval of settlement filed 
(U.S. Feb. 25, 2016).  It affirmed class certification, 
and the jury’s verdict for the plaintiffs, in a case 
where the district court had allowed use of exactly 
the same extrapolating technique that this Court re-
jected in Wal-Mart.  Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 
F.3d at 1256-1257.  See infra pp. 26-27.  The relevant 
distinction for the Tenth Circuit was that when Wal-
Mart discussed “trial by formula,” it “used this term 
to describe a novel method of calculating damages, 
where the district court determined the merits of in-
dividual claims by extrapolating from a sample set of 
class members.”  Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 
at 1256 (emphasis added).  According to the court, 
“Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on 
the use of extrapolation to calculate damages.”  Id. at 
1257 (emphasis added).  And for that reason, the 
court of appeals concluded that the class was proper-
ly certified.  Id.  
Finally, in the decision below, the Ninth Circuit 
joined the minority view.  It concluded that the 
plaintiffs needed to establish only a rough approxi-
mation of damages, Pet. App. 20a, so a model that 
did “not turn on individual circumstances” was per-
fectly permissible, Pet. App. 21a.  That decision can-
not be reconciled with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Seventh Circuits, which all have held that a damages 
model that lumps together disparate individual class 
members without any means of differentiation vio-
lates the Rules Enabling Act and the Due Process 
Clause.  This Court’s review is necessary to resolve 
the conflict. 
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3. The cert-worthiness of this question is already 
established.  In Tyson Foods, this Court granted cer-
tiorari to decide “[w]hether differences among indi-
vidual class members may be ignored and a class ac-
tion certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3) * * * where liability and damages will be de-
termined with statistical techniques that presume all 
class members are identical to the average observed 
in a sample.”  See Pet. at i, Tyson Foods, supra, 2015 
WL 1285369 (first question presented).  If this Court 
in Tyson Foods reverses the Eighth Circuit, the 
Court should grant this petition, decide the merits of 
the first question presented, and vacate the decision 
below for reconsideration of the second question pre-
sented in light of Tyson Foods.  If, on the other hand, 
this Court decides Tyson Foods on other grounds, 
this Court should grant this petition and decide the 
merits of both questions presented.  At a minimum, 
therefore, this Court should agree to decide the first 
question presented while holding the second question 
presented for Tyson Foods.  And if the Court does not 
decide the latter question in that case, it should 
grant plenary review in this one, because the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision perpetuates an entrenched circuit 
split and, as we next explain, is contrary to existing 
precedent interpreting Rule 23(b)(3). 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Embrace Of “Tri-
al By Formula” Conflicts With The 
Decisions Of This Court. 
1. The decision below cannot be squared with this 
Court’s holding in Wal-Mart.  The Court there held 
that courts cannot, under the banner of Rule 23, “re-
place [individualized] proceedings with Trial by 
Formula.”  131 S. Ct. at 2561.  In that case, the 
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Ninth Circuit had approved certification of a class of 
“1.5 million * * * current or former Wal-Mart employ-
ees who allege[d] that the company discriminated 
against them on the basis of their sex by denying 
them equal pay or promotions.”  Id. at 2547.  The 
court of appeals did not view “individualized deter-
minations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay” 
as an impediment to class certification.  Id. at 2560.  
Instead, the court “believed that it was possible to 
replace [individualized] proceedings with Trial by 
Formula” whereby the district court would identify a 
sample set of class members, determine “the average 
backpay award in the sample set,” and multiply that 
number “to arrive at the entire class recovery.”  Id. 
at 2561. 
This Court said no.  It expressly “disapprove[d]” the 
“novel project” of computing class damages by a for-
mula “without further individualized proceedings.”  
Id.  “Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids inter-
preting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); a class cannot 
be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be 
entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individu-
al claims.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
2. The decision below has just that effect.  The 
Ninth Circuit once again has endorsed a “Trial by 
Formula” approach.  It approved, for class-
certification purposes, the “Smart Pricing Method” of 
calculating damages—a method that would allow 
Plaintiffs to prove the amount allegedly owed to all 
class members by simply “apply[ing] a uniform dis-
count for all ads” to “measure[] the monetary loss.”  
Pet. App. 21a, 57a.  Therein lies the problem.  The 
uniform discount “does not turn on individual cir-
cumstances.”  Pet. App. 21a.  It instead is based on 
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averages: a comparison between the average perfor-
mance of advertisements on parked domains and er-
ror pages with the average performance of adver-
tisements on a benchmark site.  See generally Pet. 
App. 5a.  This is precisely the Rules Enabling Act 
problem that Wal-Mart warned against. 
First and foremost, the Smart Pricing Method gives 
class members substantive recovery that would be 
unavailable to them as individual plaintiffs.  Restitu-
tion is “the return of the excess of what the plaintiff 
gave the defendant over the value of what the plain-
tiff received.”  Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration 
Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 713 (Cal. 2000).  Here, it is 
measured by “the difference between what advertis-
ers actually paid and what they would have paid had 
Google informed them that their ads were being 
placed on parked domains and error pages.”  Pet. 
App. 7a.  That amount cannot be reduced to a single 
uniform discount applied across the class.  As is so 
often the case for putative Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, 
individualized damages issues overwhelm any pur-
portedly common recovery questions. 
As the district court found, AdWords prices are “de-
termined through an auction process that generates 
a separate cost for each advertiser for each ad and for 
each click, with the specific amounts determined by 
the interplay of the bidding strategies of the partici-
pating advertisers in a given auction.”  Pet. App. 55a.  
“[T]he ultimate amount Google charges for each ad 
depends on dozens of factors that are unique to each 
ad placement,” and “there is no ‘set’ price per click 
paid by all advertisers that is knowable ahead of 
time; instead all advertisers pay a different price 
that is determined based on the interplay between 
all of the differing maximum cost-per-clicks (i.e., 
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‘bids’) from all of the advertisers participating in the 
auction.”  Pet. App. 55a-56a (citation omitted).  In 
short, “any effort to determine what advertisers 
‘would have paid’ under a different set of circum-
stances requires a complex and highly individualized 
analysis of advertiser behavior for each particular ad 
that was placed.”  Pet. App. 56a.  “Plaintiffs cannot 
simply assume that a reduction in the demand for 
advertising on AdWords among some undefined 
group of advertisers would lead to a lower ‘but for’ 
price for all advertisers.”  Id. 
The uniform discount rate allows Plaintiffs to do 
just that: assume, rather than prove, that a single, 
uniform discount rate accurately calculates the pric-
es that all class members would have paid if they 
had known their advertisements would be displayed 
on parked domains and error pages.  Plaintiffs could 
not make that assumption in individually litigated 
cases.  In individual litigation, each Plaintiff would 
have to prove the extent of its economic injury with 
“substantial evidence.”  In re Tobacco Cases II, 192 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 881, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (citation 
omitted).  For example, Plaintiffs that “actively 
sought to have their ads placed on parked domains 
and error pages” would have to prove that they 
would have bid less for clicks on advertisements that 
might appear on their preferred webpages.  Pet. 
App. 57a.  Under the approved class-damages model, 
however, these Plaintiffs instead can rely on the uni-
form discount as proof of the appropriate amount of 
recovery.  That consequence enlarges their substan-
tive rights. 
Second, the Smart Pricing Method is problematic 
for yet another reason:  It deprives Google of its abil-
ity to raise individualized equitable defenses.  Cali-
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fornia law is quite clear that a trial court exercises 
complete discretion whether to order restitution for 
an unfair-competition-law violation.  Cortez, 999 P.2d 
at 716-717.  And “[i]n deciding whether to grant the 
remedy or remedies sought by a[n unfair-
competition-law] plaintiff, the court must permit the 
defendant to offer [equitable] considerations” because 
“consideration of the equities between the parties is 
necessary to ensure an equitable result.”  Id. at 717.  
See also In re Tobacco Cases II, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
895-896; Day v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 64-
65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  See generally Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process re-
quires that there be an opportunity to present every 
available defense.”) (quoting American Sur. Co. v. 
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)). 
Google is denied its right to present individualized 
equitable defenses twice over.  It cannot argue that 
the equities bar restitutionary recovery for any indi-
vidual class member because the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that “restitution is available on a classwide 
basis once the class representative makes the 
threshold showing of liability.”  Pet. App. 14a.  And it 
cannot argue that the equities minimize restitution-
ary recovery for any individual class member be-
cause the court of appeals approved a formula that 
“does not turn on individual circumstances.”  Pet. 
App. 21a. 
Google could do both of these things if it were liti-
gating the case against individual plaintiffs.  For ex-
ample, if it were defending against an individual 
claim by named Plaintiff RK West, Google could ar-
gue that the equities do not support restitution (or 
they support at most a nominal sum) because RK 
West achieved higher conversion rates on parked 
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domains and error pages than on the Smart Pricing 
benchmarks.  Pet. App. 57a.  It cannot make the 
same argument here because the Ninth Circuit has 
approved a class-damages model allowing Plaintiffs 
to argue that all class members will be entitled to the 
same discount rate once one representative makes 
the threshold liability showing.  Pet. App. 14a, 21a.  
“[A] class cannot be certified on the premise that 
[Google] will not be entitled to litigate” the actual 
amount of restitution owed to Plaintiffs, and the 
Ninth Circuit should not have approved certification 
here.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.  Indeed, to the 
extent the Smart Pricing Method sweeps into its 
reach those with no injury, there is also an Article III 
problem.  See Pet. at i, Tyson Foods, supra, 2015 WL 
1285369 (second question presented). 
Third and finally, the court of appeals’ decision ig-
nores variation in appropriate restitutionary recov-
ery in the service of class certification.  The panel 
even saw it as a benefit that its approved measure of 
restitution did “not turn on individual circumstanc-
es,” Pet. App. 21a—not because they did not exist, or 
were irrelevant, but because Plaintiffs had come up 
with a formula that could gloss over those individual 
differences.  That produces exactly the type of arbi-
trary results that Comcast warned against when the 
Court rejected a rule providing that “at the class-
certification stage any method of measurement is ac-
ceptable so long as it can be applied classwide.”  133 
S. Ct. at 1433.  “Such a proposition would reduce 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nulli-
ty.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit’s contravention of that 
principle should be corrected. 
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CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
granted. 
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the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 
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SUMMARY** 
Class Action / Restitution 
The panel reversed the district court’s denial of 
class certification in an action brought by a putative 
class of internet advertisers under California’s 
Unfair Competition Law and Fair Advertising Law, 
alleging that Google, Inc. misled them; and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
The plaintiff alleged that Google misled advertisers 
by failing to disclose the placement of AdWorks [sic] 
ads on parked domains and error pages; and sought, 
on behalf of the putative class, restitution of moneys 
Google wrongfully obtained from the putative class. 
The panel held that the district court erred in 
denying class certification based on its finding that 
the putative class did not meet the predominance 
requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  The 
panel held that the district court erred by conflating 
restitution calculation with the liability inquiry for 
Unfair Competition Law and Fair Advertising Law 
claims, and by failing to follow the rule in Yokoyama 
v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 594 F.3d 
1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that damages 
calculations alone cannot defeat class certification).  
The panel further held that the plaintiff’s proposed 
method for calculating restitution was not 
“arbitrary” under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
                                                     
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the 
court.  It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of 
the reader. 
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COUNSEL 
Miranda P. Kolbe (argued), Robert C. Schubert, and 
Willem F. Jonckheer, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe 
LLP, San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants. 
Michael G. Rhodes (argued), Whitty Somvichian, and 
Kyle C. Wong, Cooley LLP, San Francisco, 
California; Heather Meservy, Cooley LLP, San Diego, 
California, for Defendant-Appellee. 
OPINION 
PAEZ, Circuit Judge: 
Between 2004 and 2008, many online internet 
advertisers used Google, Inc.’s (“Google”) AdWords 
program, an auction-based program through which 
advertisers would bid for Google to place their 
advertisements on websites.  Pulaski & Middleman, 
LLC and several other named plaintiffs (“Pulaski”)1 
brought this putative class action under California’s 
Unfair Competition and Fair Advertising Laws, 
alleging that Google misled them as to the types of 
websites on which their advertisements could 
appear.  The putative class initially sought 
injunctive and restitutionary relief.  After Google 
changed certain features of the AdWords program, 
Pulaski, upon filing a Third Amended Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint, abandoned the claim for 
injunctive relief.  The only relief the putative class 
now seeks is the equitable remedy of restitution. 
                                                     
1  Hereafter, “Pulaski” refers collectively to Pulaski & 
Middleman, LLC and the other named plaintiffs, JIT Packaging 
Inc., RK West, Inc., and Richard Oesterling. 
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Pulaski appeals the district court’s denial of class 
certification.  The district court held that on the 
claim for restitution, common questions did not 
predominate over questions affecting individual class 
members.  In denying certification, the court 
reasoned that it was not bound by our decision in 
Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 
594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010).  It then 
explained that determining which class members are 
entitled to restitution and what amount each class 
member should receive would require individual 
inquiries that “permeate the class claims.” 
Pulaski argues that the district court erred in 
failing to follow Yokoyama.  As explained below, we 
agree.  We therefore reverse the denial of class 
certification and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  Background 
A. 
This case concerns Google’s AdWords program, an 
auction-based program through which Google served 
as an intermediary between website hosts and 
advertisers.  Through AdWords, internet advertisers 
provided advertisements to Google and its third 
party website-owner partners.  To participate, 
advertisers entered Google-defined variables into the 
AdWords interface on Google’s website, including the 
maximum price per ad they would be willing to pay 
and their overall budget.  They also selected which 
Google-defined categories of websites they wanted to 
display the ad.  Afterwards, using an auction-based 
algorithm, AdWords determined the online 
placement and price of the ad.  Thus, during the 
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class period, advertisers did not know in advance 
exactly where their ads would appear. 
Advertisers paid a particular price to Google each 
time an Internet user “clicked” on their displayed ad.  
The price of a particular click depended on several 
factors:  the maximum bids of other AdWords 
customers for clicks based on the same search term, 
a “quality score” of the advertisement, and a “Smart 
Pricing” discount applied to the website where the ad 
had been placed.  Google created and instituted 
Smart Pricing, an internally-calculated price 
adjustment, to adjust the advertiser’s bids to the 
same levels that a “rational advertiser” would bid if 
the rational advertiser had sufficient data about the 
performance of ads on each website.  Smart Pricing 
is a ratio calculated by dividing the conversion rate2 
for the lower-quality website by the conversion rate 
for the same ad on google.com. 
There are several categories of websites in play.  
During the class period, an advertiser using 
AdWords could request that its ads appear on Search 
Feed sites, Content Network sites, or both.  Search 
Feed sites display AdWords ads along with search 
results after a user searches for information using a 
particular search term.  After entering a particular 
term, a user would be presented with both ordinary 
search results and ads related to the search term.  
Content Network websites, on the other hand, are 
                                                     
2 Using Google’s terminology, a “conversion” occurs when a 
“click” leads to a particular business result defined by the 
advertiser, like a purchase or a sign-up.  A conversion rate is 
the “number of conversions divided by the number of ad clicks 
over a defined period of time.” 
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full content sites, like nytimes.com, that publish 
information independent of search results.  Ads 
would appear on these sites if the ad’s keywords 
matched those of the website. 
There are other categories of sites that did not 
appear in the AdWords registration process:  parked 
domains and error pages.  Parked domain pages are 
undeveloped domains whose pages appear when 
users type generic terms into a web browser.  These 
are pages of ads without content.  Error pages 
appear when a person inputs an unregistered web 
address, or something other than a web address, into 
a web browser’s address bar.  Typing this 
information into an address bar used to result in 
error messages, but during the class period inputting 
this information resulted in error pages that offered 
ads.  Even though only Search Feed and Content 
Network websites were listed in the AdWords 
registration process, AdWords ads appeared on both 
parked domains and error pages. 
B. 
Pulaski alleges that Google misled advertisers, 
violating California’s Unfair Competition Law 
(“UCL”), Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.,3 and 
California’s Fair Advertising Law (“FAL”), § 17500 et 
seq., by failing to disclose the placement of AdWords 
ads on parked domains and error pages.  The 
putative class consists of “[a]ll persons or entities 
located within the United States who, from July 11, 
2004 through March 31, 2008 . . . had an AdWords 
                                                     
3  All section references hereafter refer to the California 
Business and Professions Code. 
7a 
 
account with Google and were charged for clicks on 
advertisements appearing on parked domain and/or 
error page websites,” with exclusions.4  Pulaski, on 
behalf of the putative class, seeks restitution of 
moneys Google wrongfully obtained from the 
putative class. 
Pulaski moved for class certification pursuant to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“Rule 23”) for a Rule 23(b)(3) class.  Pulaski 
proposed three different methods for calculating 
restitution, all of which were based on a “but for” or 
“out-of-pocket loss” calculation:  the difference 
between what advertisers actually paid and what 
they would have paid had Google informed them that 
their ads were being placed on parked domains and 
error pages.  The first approach is based on Google’s 
Smart Pricing formula as described above.  The 
amount of restitution owed a class member would be 
the difference between the amount the advertiser 
actually paid and the amount paid reduced by the 
Smart Pricing discount ratio.  The second method is 
the Content Pricing approach,5 which factors in the 
lower bidding that would have occurred had 
advertisers been allowed to bid separately on parked 
domains and error pages.  Search Feed clicks were 
priced higher than Content Network clicks, which in 
turn were considered more desirable than parked 
                                                     
4 Beginning in March 2008, the AdWords interface allowed 
advertisers to exclude parked domain and error pages from the 
set of websites on which their ads could appear. 
5 This method focuses on clicks on parked domains and error 
pages in Google’s Search Feed, not on Content Network 
websites. 
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domains and error pages.  Accordingly, where the 
same ad appeared both in the Search Feed and on 
Content Network websites, those Content Network 
ad prices could serve as a conservative but-for price 
for Search Feed clicks on parked domains and error 
pages.  The third method is the Full Refund 
approach, in which advertisers would receive full 
refunds for clicks on ads placed on parked domains 
and error pages.  Because some methods may work 
better than others for certain subsets of class 
members, Pulaski presented these methods as 
possibly complementary. 
In ruling on the class certification motion, the 
district court initially found that the proposed class 
satisfied all of the criteria under Rule 23(a):  
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate 
representation.  The court next turned to the 
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3).  On that 
issue, it found that, even assuming the plaintiff class 
could prevail on liability, common questions did not 
predominate on the issues of entitlement to 
restitution and amount of restitution due each class 
member. 
First, the court expressed concern that individual 
questions may arise in ascertaining entitlement to 
restitution.  It observed that “the question of which 
advertisers among the hundreds of thousands of 
proposed class members are even entitled to 
restitution would require individual inquiries.”  In 
particular, the court was concerned with how to 
“systematic[ally] . . . identify and exclude from 
Plaintiffs’ proposed class the many advertisers who 
have no legal claim to restitution because they 
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derived direct economic benefits from ads placed on 
parked domains and error pages.” 
Second, the court identified individual questions 
that would arise in determining the amount of 
restitution owed to the class and individual class 
members.  The court explained that our decision in 
Yokoyama, which held that damages calculations 
alone cannot defeat class certification, did not control 
the outcome of this issue because Yokoyama cited to 
decisions that mentioned a “workable method for 
calculating monetary recovery.”  Here, the court held 
that the plaintiffs had not proposed a method that 
was workable.  The court explained that different 
costs for each advertiser, each ad, and each click, 
overlaid with an auction process, make it “more 
difficult to calculate what AdWords customers would 
have paid ‘but for’ the alleged misstatements or 
omissions.”  It concluded that Pulaski’s proposed 
methods were insufficient to account for all of the 
intricacies involved, including benefits received from 
parked domain and error pages. 
Concluding that individual questions predominated 
on the issue of restitution, the court denied Pulaski’s 
motion for class certification without addressing 
whether class treatment was a superior method for 
resolving the dispute as required by Rule 23(b)(3).  
Thereafter, Pulaski filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the district court denied. 
We granted permission to appeal the order denying 
class action certification as authorized by Rule 23(e) 
[sic].  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). 
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II.  Standard of Review 
A district court’s class certification ruling is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Parra v. 
Bashas’, Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008).  “A 
district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if 
it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or 
a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”  
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).  “[W]hen 
an appellant raises the argument that the district 
court premised a class certification determination on 
an error of law, our first task is to evaluate whether 
such legal error occurred.”  Yokoyama, 594 F.3d at 
1091.  “If the district court’s determination was 
premised on a legal error, we will find a per se abuse 
of discretion.”  Id.  Otherwise, “we will proceed to 
review the district court’s class certification decision 
for abuse of discretion as we have always done.”  Id. 
III.  Discussion 
To obtain certification, a putative class must satisfy 
four prerequisites: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable; (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class; and (4) the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
Rule 23(a).  Additionally, the proposed class must 
qualify as one of the types of class actions identified 
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in Rule 23(b).  Here, Pulaski sought to certify a class 
under Rule 23(b)(3).  Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court 
must find that “questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members,” and that a class 
action is “superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 
Pulaski must “affirmatively demonstrate . . . 
compliance with the Rule.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).  The question of 
certification requires a “rigorous analysis.”  Id.  
Courts may have to “probe behind the pleadings 
before coming to rest on the certification question.”  
Id. 
The district court denied certification because it 
found that the putative class did not meet the 
predominance requirement.  It explained that 
questions regarding which advertisers are entitled to 
restitution in the first instance, and the amount of 
restitution owed to each advertiser, both defeat 
predominance.  We disagree. 
A. 
Entitlement to restitution is a separate inquiry 
from the amount of restitution owed under 
California’s UCL and FAL.  To the extent that the 
district court rested its holding that common 
questions do not predominate on the putative class’s 
entitlement to restitution, it committed legal error. 
The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or 
fraudulent business act or practice.”  § 17200.  The 
FAL prohibits “untrue or misleading” statements in 
the course of business.  § 17500.  This language is 
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“broad” and “sweeping” to “protect both consumers 
and competitors by promoting fair competition in 
commercial markets for goods and services.”  Kwikset 
Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011). 
To state a claim under the UCL or the FAL “based 
on false advertising or promotional practices, it is 
necessary only to show that members of the public 
are likely to be deceived.”  In re Tobacco II Cases, 
46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009); 6  see also Stearns v. 
Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2011) (holding that a district court erred in denying 
class certification by requiring individualized proof of 
reliance and causation, and remanding in light of In 
re Tobacco II Cases), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1970 
(2012).  This inquiry does not require “individualized 
proof of deception, reliance and injury.”  In re 
Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 320; Stearns, 
655 F.3d at 1020 (same).  “[I]n effect, California has 
                                                     
6 Since the passage of California’s Proposition 64 in 2004, 
private suits must also allege standing under the UCL and 
FAL, i.e., that the plaintiff “suffered injury in fact” and “lost 
money or property as a result of unfair competition.”  Kwikset, 
51 Cal. 4th at 320-21 (noting that the proposition “curtailed the 
universe of those who may enforce” the UCL and FAL, although 
the laws’ “substantive reach . . . remains expansive”).  There is 
a two-part test for standing under the UCL and FAL:  the 
person must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or 
property sufficient to qualify as an injury in fact, i.e., economic 
injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, 
i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising 
that is the gravamen of the claim.”  Id. at 322.  Here, the 
district court determined that one of the class representatives 
had standing to sue, and that the class representative’s 
standing satisfied the standing requirements for the putative 
class as a whole.  Neither party challenges the district court’s 
ruling on statutory standing.  We therefore do not address it. 
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created what amounts to a conclusive presumption 
that when a defendant puts out tainted bait and a 
person sees it and bites, the defendant has caused an 
injury; restitution is the remedy.”  Stearns, 655 F.3d 
at 1021 n. 13.7 
                                                     
7 Stearns, which was decided before the district court’s ruling 
here, also noted that predominance may not exist in a UCL case 
in which different members of the class were “exposed to quite 
disparate information from various representatives of the 
defendant.”  655 F.3d at 1020.  We have elaborated on this 
concept in two cases that post-date the district court’s order.  
See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that common questions did not predominate 
where disparate information exposure undercut presumption of 
reliance); Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1069 
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that predominance did not exist for a 
putative UCL class whose members had each been exposed to 
one of five different contracts, each of which may or may not 
have alerted customers that a damage waiver was an optional 
purchase).  Google argues that the facts here present an 
example of disparate exposure under this line of cases.  Pulaski 
responds that Google’s deception was pervasive:  all AdWords 
customers could select Search Feed pages, Content Network 
pages, or both; parked domain and error pages were never 
mentioned in AdWords’s sign-up materials; Google’s contracts 
with advertisers never disclosed that Google would place their 
ads on parked domains and error pages, regardless of whether 
they chose Search Feed pages, Content Network pages, or both; 
and Google’s materials answering frequently asked questions 
did not disclose ad placement on parked domain and error 
pages.  Because Pulaski’s claim rests on allegations of deception 
through omission and falsehoods via the AdWords sign-up 
materials, all of which were presented to putative class 
members through the same online portal, Google’s argument 
that disparate information defeats predominance is 
unpersuasive. 
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Under the UCL: 
Any person who engages, has engaged, or 
proposes to engage in unfair competition may 
be enjoined in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.  The court may make such orders 
or judgments, including the appointment of a 
receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the 
use or employment by any person of any 
practice which constitutes unfair competition, 
as defined in this chapter, or as may be 
necessary to restore to any person in interest 
any money or property, real or personal, which 
may have been acquired by means of such 
unfair competition. 
§ 17203.  This language, as well as “nearly identical” 
language under the FAL, see § 17535, grants a court 
discretion to order restitution.  Cortez v. Purolator 
Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 173 (2000). 
Thus, a court need not make individual 
determinations regarding entitlement to restitution.  
Instead, restitution is available on a classwide basis 
once the class representative makes the threshold 
showing of liability under the UCL and FAL.  
Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that 
such individual questions would predominate. 
B. 
We held in Yokoyama that “damage calculations 
alone cannot defeat certification.”  594 F.3d at 1094.  
By concluding that it was not bound by Yokoyama 
under the circumstances presented in this case, the 
district court erred. 
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Yokoyama concerned the Hawaii Deceptive 
Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat § 480-2.  We concluded 
that the district court erred when it held that this 
law required individualized showings of reliance 
because Hawaii courts’ caselaw “look[ed] to a 
reasonable consumer, not the particular consumer.”  
Id. at 1092.  As we noted, the case, at the liability 
stage, would “not require the fact-finder to parse 
what oral representations each broker made to each 
plaintiff.”  Id. at 1093.  Rather, the liability portion 
would be uniform, as it “will focus on the 
standardized written material given to all plaintiffs 
to determine whether those materials are likely to 
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances.”  Id.  Because it committed legal 
error, its denial of class certification was a “[p]er [s]e 
[a]buse of [d]iscretion.”  Id. 
The district court in Yokoyama also erroneously 
concluded that the “damages calculation involved 
highly individualized and fact-specific 
determinations,” a conclusion to which the district 
court’s premise of subjective reliance may have 
contributed.  Id.  In examining predominance for 
class certification purposes, the district court had 
considered factors such as: 
the financial circumstances and objectives of 
each class member; their ages; the [indexed 
annuity product (“IAP”)] selected; any changes 
in the fixed interest rate for that particular 
IAP; the performance of the selected index; 
any changes in the index margin for that 
particular IAP; any cap on the indexed 
interest; the length of the surrender periods; 
whether the individual had undertaken or 
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wanted to undertake an early withdrawal of 
funds; any benefit the individual policy holder 
derived from the form of the annuity itself, 
including the tax-deferral of credited interest; 
and the actual rate of return on the IAP. 
Id. at 1093-94.  We held that, even though all these 
variables impacted damages calculations, the 
individualized calculations did not defeat 
predominance.  Id. at 1093; see also Stearns, 
655 F.3d at 1026 (“We have held that the mere fact 
that there might be differences in damage 
calculations is not sufficient to defeat class 
certification.”  (citing Yokoyama)). 
Google argues that Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, — 
U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), called Yokoyama’s 
holding into question.  There, in analyzing a putative 
antitrust class, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ 
proposed damages model fell “far short of 
establishing that damages are capable of 
measurement on a classwide basis.”  Id. at 1433.  
The district and circuit courts had failed to inquire 
into whether the model translated the “legal theory 
of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic 
impact of that event.”  Id. at 1435 (emphasis 
omitted).  The Court reasoned that “a model 
purporting to serve as evidence of damages in [a] 
class action must measure only those damages 
attributable to that theory.  If the model does not 
even attempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish 
that damages are susceptible of measurement across 
the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).”  Id. at 
1433.  In such a situation, “[q]uestions of individual 
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm 
questions common to the class.”  Id. 
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Since Comcast, we have continued to apply 
Yokoyama’s central holding.  In Levya v. Medline 
Industries, Inc., we reaffirmed that damage 
calculations alone cannot defeat class certification.  
716 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Yokoyama).  We explained that Comcast stood for the 
proposition that “plaintiffs must be able to show that 
their damages stemmed from the defendant’s actions 
that created the legal liability.”  Id. at 514; see also 
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407 
(2d Cir. 2015) (“Comcast held that a model for 
determining classwide damages relied upon to certify 
a class under Rule 23(b)(3) must actually measure 
damages that result from the class’s asserted theory 
of injury; but the Court did not hold that proponents 
of class certification must rely upon a classwide 
damages model to demonstrate predominance.”).  
The putative class’s problem in Comcast was that the 
damages model “did not isolate damages resulting 
from any one theory of antitrust impact.”  Levya, 
715 F.3d at 514 (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1431).  
Following this discussion, we reversed a denial of 
class certification in part because the “damages could 
feasibly and efficiently be calculated once the 
common liability questions are adjudicated.”  Id. 
We reaffirmed the proposition that differences in 
damage calculations do not defeat class certification 
after Comcast in Jimenez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Levya, 
including the portion quoting Yokoyama).  As we 
explained, our sister circuits have adopted “[s]imilar 
positions” since Comcast.  See id. at 1167-68 (citing 
cases from the Sixth, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits); 
see also Roach, 778 F.3d at 407-08 (citing cases from 
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the First, Tenth, Fifth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits, 
as well as Levya and Yokoyama, to support the 
proposition that Comcast did not hold that 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a classwide basis for damages 
calculation). 
In sum, Yokoyama remains the law of this court, 
even after Comcast.  Because “[d]amages calculations 
alone . . . cannot defeat certification” under 
Yokoyama, the district court erred in concluding that 
Yokoyama “does not apply to the facts here.”  Thus, it 
abused its discretion in denying class certification on 
this basis.  See Yokoyama, 594 F.3d at 1090-92.8 
C. 
Google argues that the district court properly 
denied Pulaski’s motion for certification under 
Comcast because the proposed method for calculating 
restitution was “arbitrary,” and thus does not satisfy 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.  See 
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.  We disagree. 
Restitution is “the return of the excess of what the 
plaintiff gave the defendant over the value of what 
the plaintiff received.”  Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 174.  
Restitution has two purposes:  “to restore the 
                                                     
8 Google also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dukes bars class certification here because, under Dukes, 
certification is inappropriate based on a lone common question.  
However, this argument is contrary to Dukes, which stated that 
“for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common 
question will do.”  131 S. Ct. at 2556.  Further, the plaintiffs in 
Dukes were pursuing a Rule 23(b)(2) class, rather than a (b)(3) 
class.  Id. at 2548-49.  As the Court made clear, it did not 
analyze Rule 23(b)(3).  Id. at 2549 n.2. 
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defrauded party to the position he would have had 
absent the fraud,” and “to deny the fraudulent party 
any benefits, whether or not for[e]seeable, which 
derive from his wrongful act.”  Nelson v. Serwold, 
687 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing the 
Restatement of Restitution). 
Restitution under the UCL and FAL “must be of a 
measurable amount to restore to the plaintiff what 
has been acquired by violations of the statutes, and 
that measurable amount must be supported by 
evidence.”  Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 
135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 698 (2006).  Where a 
defendant has wrongfully obtained a plaintiff’s 
property, “the measure of recovery for the benefit 
received . . . is the value of the property at the time 
of its improper acquisition . . . or a higher value if 
this is required to avoid injustice” where the 
property has changed in value.  Id. at 698-99 
(quoting the Restatement of Restitution).  Where 
plaintiffs are “deceived by misrepresentations into 
making a purchase, the economic harm is the same:  
the consumer has purchased a product that he or she 
paid more for than he or she otherwise might have 
been willing to pay if the product had been labeled 
accurately.”  Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 329 (emphasis in 
original).  As the California Supreme Court 
explained while discussing economic harm in the 
context of standing, this measure “is the same 
whether or not a court might objectively view the 
products as functionally equivalent”: 
Two wines might to almost any palate taste 
indistinguishable—but to serious oenophiles, 
the difference between one year and the next, 
between grapes from one valley and another 
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nearby, might be sufficient to carry with it real 
economic differences in how much they would 
pay.  Nonkosher meat might taste and in 
every respect be nutritionally identical to 
kosher meat, but to an observant Jew who 
keeps kosher, the former would be worthless. 
Id. at 329-30.  Applying these concepts to other forms 
of fraudulent omission, UCL and FAL restitution is 
based on what a purchaser would have paid at the 
time of purchase had the purchaser received all the 
information. 
In calculating damages, here restitution, California 
law “requires only that some reasonable basis of 
computation of damages be used, and the damages 
may be computed even if the result reached is an 
approximation.”  Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co., 
185 F.3d 932, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1999).  “[T]he fact that 
the amount of damage may not be susceptible of 
exact proof or may be uncertain, contingent or 
difficult of ascertainment does not bar recovery.”  Id. 
at 939. 
We conclude that Pulaski’s proposed method was 
not “arbitrary,” as Google argues.  The calculation 
need not account for benefits received after purchase 
because the focus is on the value of the service at the 
time of purchase.  Instead, in calculating restitution 
under the UCL and FAL, the focus is on the 
difference between what was paid and what a 
reasonable consumer would have paid at the time of 
purchase without the fraudulent or omitted 
information.  See Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 329. 
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Here, the harm alleged is Google’s placement of ads 
on lower-quality web pages without the advertisers’ 
knowledge.  Pulaski’s principal method for 
calculating restitution employs Google’s Smart 
Pricing ratio, which directly addresses Google’s 
alleged unfair practice by setting advertisers’ bids to 
the levels a rational advertiser would have bid if it 
had access to all of Google’s data about how ads 
perform on different websites.  Because restitution 
under the UCL and FAL measures what the 
advertiser would have paid at the outset, rather than 
accounting for what occurred after the purchase, 
using a ratio from Google’s data that adjusts for web 
page quality is both targeted to remedying the 
alleged harm and does not turn on individual 
circumstances.  Thus, the Smart Pricing method 
measures the monetary loss “resulting from the 
particular . . . injury” alleged.  See Comcast, 
133 S. Ct. at 1434.9 
IV.  Conclusion 
The district court erred by conflating restitution 
calculation with the liability inquiry for UCL and 
FAL claims, and by failing to follow our rule in 
Yokoyama. 
Further, the proposed method for calculating 
restitution was not “arbitrary” under Comcast. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
                                                     
9 Although we do not directly analyze the Content Pricing or 
the Full Refund approaches, those methods may also be 
appropriate for calculating restitution.  We express no opinion 
on the merits of any of the proposed methods. 
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APPENDIX B 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
_______________ 
Case No.:  5: 08-CV-3369 EJD 
(Re:  Docket Nos. 227, 278) 
_______________ 
IN RE GOOGLE, ADWORDS LITIGATION 
_______________ 
ORDER1 DENYING IN PART  
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE;  
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION  
TO CERTIFY CLASS 
_______________ 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Presently before the Court are two matters:  (1) a 
Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs West 
Coast Cameras (Richard Oesterling), Pulaski and 
Middleman (Adam Pulaski), JIT Packaging (Michael 
Hrbacek), and RK West (collectively, “Plaintiffs”); 
and (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. 
This case involves Plaintiffs’ allegations that 
Google, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Google”) allegedly 
engaged in deceptive advertising and unfair, 
deceptive and unlawful business practices regarding 
                                                     
1 This disposition is not designated for publication in the 
official reports. 
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Google AdWords.  The named Plaintiffs seek to 
represent a class of former and current Google 
AdWords customers who purchased Google AdWords 
services.  In order to place the dispute in context, the 
Court provides a brief background of the Google 
AdWords product. 
Google AdWords is a program that allows 
advertisers to create online advertisements and 
display them through various channels on the 
Internet.  Docket Item No. 272 at 3.  These ads are 
generally short text ads with hyperlinks that, when 
clicked, take the user to the advertiser’s website.  Id.  
Ads placed through the AdWords program are 
displayed on the Google Network, which includes the 
Search Network and (during the class period) the 
Content Network.  Id.  The Google Network also 
included the parked domains and error pages that 
are the subject of this lawsuit.  Id. 
A parked domain is a webpage that has a 
registered web address but is relatively undeveloped 
and consists primarily of ads or links displayed on 
the page.  Docket Item No. 272 at 3.  Owners of 
parked domains can participate in Google’s AdSense 
for domains program (AFD) to display ads placed by 
advertisers through the Ad Words program.  Id. at 4.  
Parked domains are part of both the Search and 
Content Networks.  Id. 
Error pages are web pages that act as placeholders 
when a user enters terms into the address bar of the 
web browser that does not link to a registered URL.  
Id.  Rather than returning an error message saying 
no web site could be found, Google’s AdSense for 
errors program (AFE) may display a webpage that 
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contains ads or links matching the terms entered by 
the user, similar to the parked domains sites 
described above.  Id. 
Internet users typically arrive at parked domains 
and error pages (and view ads there) by entering 
particular terms of interest to them, either in the 
address bar of a web browser or a search box on a 
parked domain or error page.  Docket Item No. 272 
at 5.  Google’s algorithms then attempt to match an 
advertiser’s ads with the terms the user has entered.  
Id.  The ads that a user sees when he/she lands on a 
parked domain or error page are therefore the 
byproduct of the user’s own search actions.  Id. 
Plaintiffs allege that, throughout the Class Period, 
all AdWords customers were given the choice of 
advertising in Google’s Search or Content Networks, 
yet Google never disclosed that regardless of which 
network they chose, Google would place their ads on 
parked domains or error pages.  Docket Item No. 282 
at 1.  Plaintiffs contend that Google was aware of the 
negative reputation of parked domains and error 
pages, and took numerous steps to purposefully 
conceal its involvement with these sites throughout 
the Class Period.  Id.  According to Plaintiffs, Google 
not only failed to disclose its practice of placing 
AdWords customers’ ads on parked domains and 
error pages on its AdWords sign-up and Help Center 
pages, but purposefully published misleading 
AdSense policies which prohibited publishers from 
putting ads on pages lacking content, and “rolled up” 
the URLs of AFD and AFE sites on Google’s 
Placement Performance Reports so that advertisers 
could not see the actual sites upon which Google had 
placed their ads.  Docket Item No. 282 at 2.  
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Plaintiffs claim that Google feared the truth being 
revealed because it would risk losing the substantial 
revenue that it earned from its AFD and AFE 
programs, and also would risk damage to its own 
reputation.  Docket Item No. 282 at 1. 
Google argues that Plaintiffs and their experts 
fundamentally misunderstand how Google’s 
AdWords product works.  Docket Item No. 262 at 1.  
For instance, Google contends that Plaintiffs 
presume that every single ad that appeared on any 
parked domain or error page was intrinsically 
worthless and harmful, without accounting for the 
many instances in which advertisers reaped 
demonstrable benefits from such ads and without 
regard to advertisers’ actual perceptions of parked 
domains and error pages.  Docket Item No. 272 at 1.  
Additionally, Google maintains that, throughout the 
class period, it made specific disclosures regarding 
the AdWords network and the AdSense for domains 
program.  Id. at 7.  Finally, Google argues that it 
provides a tool that allows advertisers to self-help 
and exclude their ads from entire categories of web 
pages, including parked domains and error pages.  
Id. at 8. 
In July 2008, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit, 2 
alleging that Google engaged in deceptive 
                                                     
2 Plaintiffs filed five separate but related class actions against 
Defendant.  See Levine v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-3369 JW (filed 
Jul. 11, 2008), RK West, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-03452 JW 
(filed Jul. 14, 2008), Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 
No. C 08-03888 JW (filed Aug. 14, 2008), JIT Packing, Inc. v. 
Google, Inc., No. C 08-04701 JW (filed Oct. 10, 2008), Olabode v. 
Google, Inc., No. C 09-3414 JW (filed July 27, 2009). The first 
four cases were consolidated by the court on February 25, 2009 
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advertising and unfair, deceptive and unlawful 
business practices in violation of the California 
Business and Profession Code Sections 17200 and 
17500 by charging AdWords customers for any clicks 
on their advertisements that Google placed on 
parked domains or error pages from July 17, 2004 
through March 31, 2008.  Docket Item No. 228. 
After several amendments to the pleadings, 3 
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification 
(“Motion”).  Docket Item No. 227.  Google opposed 
the motion, arguing that litigation of Plaintiffs’ 
claims would require individualized and fact-
intensive inquiries that make class treatment 
inappropriate.  See Defendant’s Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification Pursuant to 
F.R.C.P. 23 (“Opp’n”), Docket Item No. 272.  
Plaintiffs replied to the Opposition, submitting 
expert witness declaration as support.  See Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Class Certification (“Reply”), Docket Item No. 282; 
Declaration of Dr Stan V. Smith Regarding 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Smith 
Declaration”), Docket Item No. 283.  After the close 
                                                                                                             
(the “Consolidated Cases”).  See Order Granting Motion to 
Consolidate, Docket Item No. 40. The fifth case, Olabode v. 
Google, Inc., No. 09-3414 JW, was subsequently filed and 
consolidated with the Consolidated Cases. See Stipulation and 
Order Consolidating Olabode v. Google, Inc., No. 09-3414 JW 
into In Re Google AdWords Litigation, No. 08-3369 JW, Docket 
Item No. 67. 
3 See Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint 
for Violation of California Business and Professions Code 
Sections 17200 et seq. and 17500 et seq., (“Complaint”), Docket 
Item No. 166. 
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of briefing on the class certification motion, Google 
filed an objection pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d), 
raising various objections to the Smith Declaration.  
See Objections to Reply Evidence in Plaintiffs’ Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Class Certification, Docket Item No. 267.  Plaintiffs 
filed a motion to strike certain declarations filed by 
Google in opposition to the class certification motion.  
See Motion to Strike (“Mot’n to Strike”), Docket Item 
No. 278. 
On June 24, 2011, the court heard oral arguments 
in support of and opposition to the Motion for Class 
Certification and Motion to Strike.  Docket Item No. 
308.  At the court’s request following the hearing, the 
parties submitted supplemental briefs regarding the 
issue of commonality.  See Plaintiff’s Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Class 
Certification (“Plaintiff’s Supp’l Mem.”), Docket Item 
No. 307; Google, Inc.’s Supplemental Brief in 
Support of Its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Class Certification (“Defendant’s Supp’l Mem.”), 
Docket Item No. 306. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Before addressing Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Strike certain declarations submitted by Google. 
A. MOTION TO STRIKE 
In support of its Opposition, Defendant submitted 
declarations of three employees:  (1) Hal Varian, (2) 
Jonathan Alferness, and (3) William Kunz.  Plaintiffs 
argue that each of the declarations should be 
stricken to the extent they contain expert opinions 
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offered under the guise of lay witness testimony.  
Defendant responds that the testimony is that of lay 
witness employees and thus falls outside the scope of 
the Rule 26 disclosure requirements. 
1. Legal Standards 
a. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
26 and 37 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), a 
party must “disclose to other parties the identity of 
any person who may be used at trial to present 
evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A).  In 
addition, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires: 
[The] disclosure shall, with respect to a 
witness who is retained or specially employed 
to provide expert testimony in the case or 
whose duties as an employee of the party 
regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and 
signed by the witness.  The report shall 
contain a complete statement of all opinions to 
be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefor; the data or other information 
considered by the witness in forming the 
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a 
summary of or support for the opinions; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of 
all publications authored by the witness 
within the preceding ten years; the 
compensation to be paid for the study and 
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in 
which the witness has testified as an expert at 
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trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(c)(1), “[a] party that without 
substantial justification fails to disclose information 
required by Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure 
is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, 
at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or 
information not so disclosed.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 
b. Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay witnesses 
may provide testimony that goes beyond percipient 
observations and consists of opinions or inferences: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, 
the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to those opinions or 
inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of the witness’ testimony 
or the determination of a fact in issue, and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702. 
Fed. R. Evid.701. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
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in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is 
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles 
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied 
the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
While the text of Rule 701 appears to clearly 
separate lay opinion testimony from that of experts, 
the advisory committee note regarding subsection (c) 
makes the distinction less obvious.  For instance, a 
lay witness may testify to the value of property or 
expected profits without the necessity of qualifying 
the witness as an accountant, appraiser, or similar 
expert.  Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Notes 
to 2000 Amendment; see, e.g., Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993).  Such lay 
opinion testimony is admissible not because of 
experience, training or specialized knowledge within 
the realm of an expert, but because of the 
“particularized knowledge that the witness has by 
virtue of his or her position in the business.”  Id. 
Since the 2000 amendment to Rule 701, courts 
have continued to allow lay opinion testimony based 
upon particularized knowledge obtained by virtue of 
the witness’s position in the business.  For example, 
several courts have admitted fact and opinion 
testimony from lay witnesses on a broad range of 
“technical” or “specialized” subjects without 
considering those witnesses “experts” under Federal 
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Rule of Evidence 702.  See Minority Television 
Project, Inc. v. FCC, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (allowed Vice President of large 
broadcasting station to hypothesize about impact 
that commercial advertising might have on the 
operations of other public radio stations because 
“[m]ost, if not all of [the witness’s] testimony” [was] 
based upon his particularized knowledge gained by 
virtue of his position in the business); Hynix 
Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. CV-00-
20905 RMW, 2008 WL 504098, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
19, 2008) (noting that the business owner/employee 
exception has survived the 2000 amendments to Rule 
701); United States v. Munoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 
35-36 (1st Cir. 2007) (allowing bank employee to 
explain a bank’s internal loan procedures and to 
provide lay opinions on whether the disputed loan 
classifications were appropriate even though 
employee was not part of that loan department and 
had no firsthand knowledge of the loans at issue); 
Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Management  
Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(permitted testimony of computer programmer 
regarding terms contained in copyright registration 
because programmer had personal knowledge of 
their meaning, based on his everyday experience as a 
computer programmer).4 
                                                     
4 The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the advisory committee 
note in this specific context. It has, however, favorably relied on 
a related paragraph of the note regarding admission of lay 
opinion testimony based upon personal knowledge and 
familiarity with narcotics.  See United States v. Durham, 
464 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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The Court finds these cases “persuasive only in the 
limited context described in the advisory committee 
note regarding testimony about one’s business,” and 
“does not believe they can be read to support a 
broader ‘particularized knowledge’ exception to the 
expert disclosure rules.”  Hynix Semiconductor, No. 
CV-00-20905 RMW, 2008 WL 504098, at *4.  
Although, generally, “lay opinion testimony is 
admissible only to help the jury or the court to 
understand the facts about which the witness is 
testifying and not to provide specialized explanations 
or interpretations that an untrained layman could 
not make if perceiving the same acts or events,”5 the 
rules of evidence “have long permitted a person to 
testify to opinions about their own business based on 
their personal knowledge of their business,” as 
illustrated in the cases discussed above.  The Court 
does not believe that the revisions to Rule 701 were 
intended to exclude that form of personal testimony. 
2. The Proffered Testimony of Google’s 
Employees 
a. Declaration of Hal Varian 
Hal Varian is Google’s Chief Economist.  Opp’n to 
Mot’n to Strike at 2.  The majority of Dr. Varian’s 
declaration provides a factual description of how the 
AdWords pricing system works, based directly from 
Dr. Varian’s personal knowledge and experience.  
See Declaration of Hal Varian in support of Google’s 
Opposition to Class Certification (“Varian Decl.”), 
                                                     
5 United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 553-54 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 
2001)). 
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¶¶ 1-4; 7-23.  These facts are relevant and necessary 
for the Court to have a basic understanding of a key 
issue posed in Plaintiffs Motion for Class 
Certification as to how the cost of advertising is 
determined in the AdWords System.  Opp’n to Mot’n 
to Strike at 2.  Plaintiffs do not contend that Dr. 
Varian lacks the personal knowledge or experience to 
testify about these underlying facts.  Mot’n to Strike 
at 7-11.  In fact, Plaintiffs counsel conceded at oral 
argument that the factual testimony of Google’s 
employees is admissible.  See Transcript of 
Proceedings Held on June 24, 2011 (“Hearing 
Transcript”) at 19:24-20:5; 21:24-25; 27:14-18. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that Dr. Varian’s 
declaration also contains opinions that should be 
stricken as expert testimony in violation of Rule 26 
disclosures.  Mot’n to Strike at 8-11.  According to 
Plaintiffs, Dr. Varian should not be permitted to 
opine, among other things, that there is “no ‘overall’ 
or ‘set price’ that could be applied uniformly across 
hundreds of thousands of advertisers in the class.”  
Varian Decl. at ¶ 16.  Plaintiffs argue that this and 
similar assertions constitute expert rebuttal 
testimony on the viability of determining class-wide 
restitution.  Mot’n to Strike at 7. 
Defendant responds that the primary purpose of 
Varian’s Declaration is to explain to the Court how 
advertisers are charged for the advertisements 
placed through Google AdWords, the subject matter 
of this litigation.  Id.  Additionally, Defendants argue 
that Dr. Varian’s personal knowledge and experience 
permits him to make certain assertions as a lay 
witness under Rule 701.  Opp’n to Mot’n to Strike at 
4. 
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The Court will admit Dr. Varian’s testimony 
regarding his knowledge of how the AdWords system 
works and his experience in applying economic 
modeling to study the AdWords System.  As Google’s 
Chief Economist, Dr. Varian is qualified to explain, 
as a lay witness, what Google’s AdWords system 
does, how it behaves, and what it does when certain 
variables are changed.  Here, just because the 
underlying facts and data are technical in nature 
does not transform the information into “expert 
testimony” when those facts are within the personal 
knowledge and experience of the company’s 
employee.  Dr. Varian may offer lay witness opinions 
regarding Google’s business, so long as those 
opinions are based on his own personal, 
particularized knowledge and experience relating to 
his employment at Google.  See Lightning Lube, Inc., 
4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Minority Television 
Project, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (N.D. Cal. 
2009); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., 2008 WL 504098, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008); Munoz-Franco, 
487 F.3d at 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007; Medforms, Inc., 
290 F.3d at 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002).  To the extent that 
Dr. Varian opines on the merits of the case, such as 
the viability of classwide restitution, his testimony 
will be disregarded.  Accordingly, the Court DENIES 
IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Declaration 
of Hal Varian. 
b. Declaration of Jonathan Alferness 
Jonathan Alferness is a senior Google employee 
who has worked extensively on AdWords for nearly 
seven years.  Opp’n to Mot’n to Strike at 4.  During 
Plaintiffs’ proposed class period, Mr. Alferness had 
primary responsibility for Google’s AdSense for 
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search and AdSense for errors program.  Id.  Mr. 
Alferness has extensive personal knowledge of and 
experience in how Google’s AdWord program 
operates, including the data that is created in the 
process.  Id. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that Dr. Varian lacks the 
personal knowledge or experience to testify about 
facts underlying Google’s AdWords or AdSense 
programs.  Mot’n to Strike at 11-13; see Transcript of 
Proceedings Held on June 24, 2011 at 19:24-20:5; 
21:24-25; 27:14-18.  Instead, Plaintiffs rely on Funai 
Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., No. C 04-1830 CRB, 
2007 WL 1089702 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007) and 
move to strike the Alferness Declaration on the basis 
that he reviewed and analyzed data of a named 
plaintiff “for the purpose of assisting Google in this 
litigation.”  Mot’n to Strike at 11.  Plaintiffs’ reliance 
is misplaced.  In Funai, the court focused on whether 
an already disclosed expert, who was an employee of 
the defendant, had to draft a written report.  There, 
the court determined that the employee had to 
disclose expert testimony on “matters that are 
outside the scope of his employment.”  Id at 1.  Here, 
in contrast, the Alferness Declaration sets forth facts 
that are within the scope of Mr. Alferness’ 
employment and concern data analysis with which 
he is personally familiar.  The fact that he reviewed 
the data after Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was filed does not 
preclude his testimony under Rule 701.  See 
Lightening Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1174-75 (allowing 
business owner to provide lay opinion testimony that 
relied on facts developed for purposes of litigation). 
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Alferness’s 
testimony should be excluded because the underlying 
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facts in the Alferness Declaration overlap with 
certain facts contained in the report of an expert 
previously retained by Defendant.  Mot’n to Strike at 
11-13.  The Court is not persuaded by this argument 
and finds that Mr. Alferness personal knowledge of 
and day-to-day experience with AdWords are 
sufficient to allow his testimony independent of any 
previous factual recitation by Defendant’s prior 
expert.6  Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ 
motion to strike the Declaration of Jonathan 
Alferness. 
c. Declaration of William Kunz  
William Kunz is a manager in Goolge’s Partners 
Solutions Organization, which serves as a 
technical/engineering arm of the “publisher” side of 
Google’s business.  As part of Mr. Kunz’s daily job 
responsibilities, he routinely pulls and analyzes data 
related to the AdWords and AdSense products and 
reports these matters to fellow Google employees.  
Opp’n to Mot’n to Strike at 6. 
Plaintiffs do not contest that Mr. Kunz has the 
personal knowledge and experience to testify about 
                                                     
6  Mr. Alferness may offer lay witness opinions regarding 
Google’s business, so long as those opinions are based on his 
own personal, particularized knowledge and experience relating 
to his employment at Google.  See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d 
1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Minority Television Project, Inc., 649 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., 
2008 WL 504098, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008); Munoz-
Franco, 487 F.3d at 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007; Medforms, Inc., 
290 F.3d at 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002).  The Court will disregard 
Mr. Alferness’ testimony to the extent that he opines on the 
merits of the case. 
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the data described in his declaration.  Motion to 
Strike at 14; see Hearing Transcript at 19:24-20:5; 
21:24-25; 27:14-18.  Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. 
Kunz did not review the data until after the instant 
lawsuit was filed and contend they are “prejudiced” 
by Defendant’s presentation of the data analysis 
testimony at this point in the litigation.  Mot’n to 
Strike at 14. 
As previously discussed, the fact that Mr. Kunz 
reviewed the data after Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was filed 
does not preclude his testimony under Rule 701.  See 
Lightening Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1174-75 (allowing 
business owner to provide lay opinion testimony that 
relied on facts developed for purposes of litigation).  
Mr. Kunz routinely runs data pulls related to 
Google’s AdWords and AdSense programs as part of 
his daily job responsibilities.  See Declaration of 
William Kunz in support of Google’s Opposition to 
Class Certification (“Kunz Decl.”), ¶ 2.  Given this 
day-to-day experience, Mr. Kunz is permitted to 
explain, in the form of lay witness testimony, the 
data that he pulled relating to the number of 
advertisers who “opted out” of placing their ads on 
parked domains and error pages through those 
programs.  Additionally, Mr. Kunz may offer lay 
witness opinions regarding Google’s business, so long 
as those opinions are based on his own personal, 
particularized knowledge and experience relating to 
his employment at Google.  See Lightning Lube, Inc., 
4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Minority Television 
Project, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (N.D. Cal. 
2009); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., 2008 WL 504098, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008); Munoz-Franco, 
487 F.3d at 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007); Medforms, Inc., 
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290 F.3d at 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002).  Mr. Kunz may 
not, however, opine on the merits of the case, and 
any such testimony will be disregarded by the Court. 
Plaintiffs lack support for their allegation of 
prejudice due to Mr. Kunz’s opt-out data analysis.  
First, Mr. Kunz is not an expert witness and the 
Court will not permit him to testify as one.  See 
supra.  Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs 
failed to serve written discovery or ask deposition 
questions about opt-out rates during class 
certification discovery.  Any prejudice Plaintiffs 
suffer as a result is not grounds for excluding Mr. 
Kunz’s lay witness testimony that is based on 
personal, particularized knowledge and experience 
relating to his employment at Google.  Accordingly, 
the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the 
Declaration of William Kunz.  
B. MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS 
Plaintiffs move to certify the following class: 
All Google AdWords Customers who, during 
the period July 17, 2004 through March 31, 
2008 (the “Class Period”), were charged by 
Google for clicks on their advertisements that 
Google placed on parked domains or error 
pages. 
Docket Item No. 228.  Plaintiffs assert the proposed 
class satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).  Defendant 
questions whether the class includes plaintiffs who 
lack Article III standing, and disputes that Plaintiffs 
have met the requirements for class certification. 
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1. Defendant’s Objections to Reply Evidence 
As a threshold matter, the Court addresses 
Defendant’s “Objections to Reply Evidence” pursuant 
to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d), which was filed after the 
close of briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification.  See Objections to Reply Evidence 
(“Objection”), Docket Item No. 267.  In the Objection, 
Defendant asks the Court to strike the Smith 
Declaration on the basis that the declaration 
constitutes “new evidence,” a previously undisclosed 
expert opinion, and a regurgitation of prior reports.  
Objection at 2.  Plaintiffs argue that the Smith 
Declaration simply responds to and rebuts the 
opinions asserted by Defendant’s witnesses in the 
Opposition.  See Plaintiff’s Response to Google’s 
Objections to Reply Evidence, Docket Item No. 290-1. 
Having read the parties’ arguments, the Court 
finds that the Smith Declaration does not contain 
additional expert opinions or evidence, but instead 
responds to the criticisms and evidence presented by 
Defendant’s Opposition, drawing upon Dr. Smith’s 
previously disclosed expert reports and documents 
that Defendant produced during discovery.  
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request 
to strike the Smith Declaration and any references to 
it in the Reply Brief. 
2. Standing 
Before considering whether Plaintiffs’ proposed 
classes meet the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, the Court will determine whether 
Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class have 
Article III standing.  See Easter v. Am. West Fin., 
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381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004).  Defendant 
expresses doubts as to whether some of the named 
Plaintiffs have standing, Opp’n at 11, and challenges 
the standing of the potential members of the 
proposed class.  Opp’n at 13-15. 
a. Standing of Class Representatives 
The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice.”  Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 17200.  California’s FAL also prohibits 
any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading 
advertising.”  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.  “Any 
violation of the false advertising law” necessarily 
violates the UCL.  Williams v. Gerber Products 
Company, 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008). 
In 2004, Proposition 64 amended the standing 
requirements under the UCL and FAL so that a 
private plaintiff has standing to bring a UCL or FAL 
action if the plaintiff “has suffered injury in fact and 
has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 
competition.”  Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code §§ 17204, 17535.  
The California Supreme Court has held that the 
phrase “[‘as a result’] of imposes an actual reliance 
requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private 
enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.”  
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326 (2009).  
A plaintiff can prove reliance “by showing that the 
defendant’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure was 
an immediate cause of the plaintiffs injury-producing 
conduct.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  One way for a plaintiff to prove that the 
omission was “an immediate cause” of the plaintiffs 
injury-producing conduct is by showing that, in the 
absence of the omission, the named plaintiff “in all 
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reasonable probability would not have engaged in 
the injury-producing conduct.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Moreover, a 
presumption, or at least an inference, of reliance 
arises wherever there is a showing that a 
misrepresentation was material.”  Id. at 326-327 
(citation omitted).  Under California law, a 
misrepresentation is considered material “if a 
reasonable man would attach importance to its 
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice 
of action in the transaction in question . . . .”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, named Plaintiff Pulaski & Middleman, LLC 
(“Pulaski & Middleman”) alleges that (1) it viewed 
parked domain and error pages as “low quality” 
websites upon which it did not want to advertise, and 
(2) Google knew Pulaski & Middleman was likely to 
regard its placement of its ads on parked domains 
and error pages “as important in determining [its] 
chose of action.”  Motion at 4-5, 17.  Pulaski & 
Middleman further assert that it was misled by 
Google’s omissions, and that Google’s omissions 
caused it to purchase advertising that it would not 
otherwise have bought and to overpay for clicks on 
ads on parked domains and error pages.  Motion at 
18.  Additionally, Pulaski & Middleman contends 
that, “in all reasonable probability,” had Google 
adequately disclosed the truth, it would not have 
acted as it did.  Motion at 18; Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 
at 326.  In other words, Pulaski & Middleman alleges 
that Defendant’s omissions concerning its AdWords 
system were material.  The Court finds that these 
allegations are sufficient to establish reliance. 
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To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff 
must also demonstrate “concrete and particularized” 
injury.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992).  The injury here meets both of those 
requirements.  Pulaski & Middleman has submitted 
evidence in support of its allegation that, as a result 
of Google’s deception and unfair business practices, it 
purchased advertising that it otherwise would not 
have.  Motion at 4-5; see Ex. 20, Pulaski Second 
Suppl. Resp. to Interrog. No. 7; see Ex.12, Pulaski 
Suppl. Resp. to Interrog. No. 8.  By this evidence, 
Pulaski & Middleman has sufficiently shown that it 
has “lost money or property” so as to confer standing.  
See e.g., Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 298; Kwikset v. 
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 319-325 (in UCL 
action, one of the “innumerable ways” in which 
economic injury can be shown is purchasing more 
products or services than the plaintiff otherwise 
would have purchased).  For the foregoing reasons, 
the court finds that the named Plaintiff Pulaski & 
Middleman has met the injury-in-fact requirement 
for standing under the UCL and FAL, and under 
Article III. 
In UCL and FAL class actions, Article III standing 
is satisfied if at least one of the named plaintiffs 
meets the requirements.  Stearns v. Ticketmaster 
Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Fleming v. Pickard, 
581 F.3d 922, 924 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2009); and Casey v. 
Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993)).  Thus, the court 
need not examine whether the other named 
Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Article III. 
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b. Standing of Unnamed Class Members 
Defendant argues that even in UCL cases, absent 
class members must satisfy Article III standing, and, 
as a result, the question of whether each member has 
suffered a concrete injury requires a fact intensive 
individualized inquiry.  Opp’n at 13-15.  Plaintiffs 
disagree, arguing that only the named class 
representatives must meet standing requirements 
after the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298.  Reply at 3-5. 
The requirements of Article III turn on the nature 
of the claim that is asserted.  See Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).  In California, relief under 
the UCL and FAL 7  “is available without 
individualized proof of deception, reliance, and 
injury.”  In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 320.  
Claims under the UCL and FAL are subject to an 
objective test that requires a plaintiff only “show 
that members of the public are likely to be deceived” 
by a defendant’s representations about its product.  
Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020 (quoting In re Tobacco II 
Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 320).  However, as noted above 
in Section II.B.2.a., the UCL and FAL still require 
that plaintiffs suffer injury in fact. Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code §§ 17204, 17535.  The requirement of concrete 
injury is satisfied when the Plaintiffs and class 
members in UCL and FAL actions suffer an 
economic loss caused by the defendant, namely the 
purchase of defendant’s product containing 
misrepresentations.  Bruno v. Quten Research 
                                                     
7 Claims under the FAL and UCL rely on the same objective 
test, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 312, and thus the 
court addresses them together in this analysis. 
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Institute, LLC, ---F.R.D. ---, No. SACV 11-00173 
DOC(Ex), 2011 WL 5592880, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
14, 2011); Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020-21.  Moreover, a 
showing of concrete injury under the UCL and FAL 
is sufficient to establish Article III standing.  Bruno, 
---F.R.D. ---, 2011 WL 5592880, at *4; Stearns, 
655 F.3d at 1020-21.  Thus, any inquiry into whether 
the unnamed class members satisfy Article III 
standing depends upon an objective test, not a fact-
intensive inquiry as Defendants contend. 
Here, the court need not analyze unnamed class 
members’ Article III standing because Pulaski & 
Middleman’s Article III standing has already been 
established.  “[T]he majority of authority indicates 
that it is improper for [the court] to analyze 
unnamed class members’ Article III standing 
where . . .  Defendants do not successfully challenge 
the putative class representative’s standing.”  Bruno 
v. Quten Research Institute, LLC, ---F.R.D. ---, 
No. SACV 11-00173 DOC(Ex), 2011 WL 5592880, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 
518 U.S. 343, 395 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(class certification “does not require a demonstration 
that some or all of the unnamed class could 
themselves satisfy the standing requirements for 
named plaintiffs.”)).  As the Ninth Circuit observed 
in Stearns, this Circuit has repeatedly held that “[i]n 
a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one 
named plaintiff meets the requirements . . . .  Thus, 
we consider only whether at least one named 
plaintiff satisfies the standing requirements.”  Id. 
(citing Stearns 655 F.3d at 1021).  Numerous district 
courts in California have reached the same 
conclusion, that standing “is assessed solely with 
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respect to class representatives, not unnamed 
members of the class.” 8   There are, however, 
numerous district courts in California that have 
found just the opposite:  that even absent class 
members must establish Article III standing.9  The 
Central District of California recently examined this 
paradox and concluded that, in UCL or FAL cases, 
the court need not analyze the standing of unnamed 
class members where Article III standing has been 
established for at least one named plaintiff.  Bruno,  
                                                     
8  See Aho v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.,  
— F.R.D. —, Case No. 10-CV-1373 DMS (BLM), 2011 WL 
5401799, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (limiting the court’s 
inquiry to the representative party, who met the standing 
requirements of Article III); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., Case 
No. No. C 10-01192 JSW, 2011 WL 2221113, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
June 7, 2011) (“in general, standing in a class action is assessed 
solely with respect to class representatives, not unnamed 
members of the class”) (internal citation omitted); Greenwood v. 
Compucredit Corp., Case No. 08-04878 CW, 2010 WL 4807095, 
at * 3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (holding that “Plaintiffs are not 
required to establish absent class members’ individual reliance 
and personal standing”); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Bev. Co., 
268 F.R.D. 365, 376 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“unnamed class members 
in an action under the [California] Unfair Competition Law 
(“UCL”) . . . are not required to establish standing.”). 
9 See O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
105504, at *28-31 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011) (holding that 
absent class members must satisfy the requirements of Article 
III); Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (Fogel, J.) (same); Webb v. Carter’s Inc., 272 F.R.D. 489 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding absent class members in UCL action 
must satisfy Article III standing requirements); In re Light 
Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 402, 416-20 
(D. Me. 2010) (same); Burdick v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., No. CV 07-
4028 ABC, 2009 WL 4798873, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009) 
(same). 
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---F.R.D. ---, 2011 WL 5592880, at *4-5.  The court in 
Bruno also adopted a rule that, “where the class 
representative has established standing and 
defendants argue that class certification is 
inappropriate because unnamed class members’ 
claims would require individualized analysis of 
injury or differ too greatly from the plaintiffs, a court 
should analyze these arguments through Rule 23 
and not by examining the Article III standing of the 
class representative or unnamed class members.”  Id.  
This court is persuaded by the well-reasoned 
analysis in Bruno and concludes that where one class 
representative in a UCL or FAL class action has 
already established Article III standing, the court 
need not analyze the standing of unnamed class 
members.10  Additionally, this court finds it more 
appropriate to address Defendants’ argument 
regarding the fact-intensive, highly individualized 
analysis of injury under Rule 23(b) in section 
II.B.3.c., below. 
3. Legal Standard for Class Action 
Certification 
A party seeking class certification must provide 
facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  Doninger v. Pacific 
Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (9th 
Cir. 1977). Under Rule 23(a), a class may only be 
                                                     
10 In any event, the proposed class here meets the standing 
requirements of Article III.  Consumers who purchased the 
Google AdWords product have Article III standing, as they were 
relieved of money in the transactions. See, e.g., Kwikset Corp. 
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 329 (2011); Stearns, 
655 F.3d at 1021. 
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certified if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions 
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a).   In addition, the party seeking certification 
must show that the action falls within one of the 
three subsections of Rule 23(b). 
In this case, Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant 
to 23(b)(3), which permits certification of cases where 
“the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and 
that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  Plaintiffs bear 
the burden of demonstrating that they have met the 
four requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the 
predominance and superiority requirements of 
Rule 23(b)(3).  See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 
Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 
by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). 
A trial court has broad discretion in making the 
decision to grant or deny a motion for class 
certification.  Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, 
Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2010).  A party 
seeking class certification must affirmatively 
demonstrate compliance with Rule 23 and be 
prepared to prove that the requirements of Rule 23 
are met.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 
2541, 2550-51 (2011).  This requires a district court 
to conduct a “rigorous analysis” that frequently “will 
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entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs 
underlying claim.”  Id. 
a. Ascertainability 
Defendant argues that this case presents a problem 
of whether the class is ascertainable.  According to 
Defendant, even if the court would approve a class of 
AdWords customers entitled to restitution, Plaintiffs 
have not offered an appropriate mechanism for 
determining who those customers might be.  As 
explained below, in Section II.B.3.c., there is no 
systematic way to identify and exclude from 
Plaintiffs’ proposed class the many advertisers who 
have no legal claim to restitution because they 
derived direct economic benefits from ads placed on 
parked domains and error pages.11  See Opp’n at 6.  
However, given the class definition proposed by 
Plaintiffs, the court views this as an issue regarding 
entitlement to restitution, not ascertainability. 
                                                     
11  Defendant contends that ascertainability of all class 
members who are not entitled to restitution is impossible. The 
vast majority of advertisers in the proposed class did not elect 
to use Google’s tool to calculate conversion rates. Varian Decl. 
at ¶ 21. As such, there is no class-wide method to determine the 
benefits that advertisers may have received from sales or other 
conversion events. Even if all AdWords accounts were opted 
into conversion tracking, conversion rates alone may not be a 
satisfactory measure of the overall benefits achieved from ads 
placed on parked domains and error pages. See Bucklin Expert 
Report (Docket Item No. 281-1) and Rebuttal Expert Rpt. of 
Randolph E. Bucklin (Docket Item No. 281-2). 
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b. Rule 23(a) Requirements 
1. Numerosity 
Numerosity is satisfied where “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).  “‘[G]enerally 
if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the 
potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40,’ the 
numerosity requirement is satisfied.”  Miletak v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 WL 809579, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 5, 2010) (citation omitted); see also O’Shea, 
2011 WL 4352458 at *2.  Plaintiffs seek to certify a 
class consisting of hundreds of thousands of Google 
AdWords customers.  Mot’n at 19.  Although 
Defendant contests other Rule 23 requirements, it 
does not dispute that Plaintiffs’ proposed class 
satisfies the numerosity requirement.  See Hearing 
Transcript at 48:17-19.  Thus, the numerosity 
requirement is met here. 
2. Commonality 
To prevail under Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality 
standard, the plaintiff must establish common 
questions of law and fact among class members.  
This requirement is met through the existence of a 
“common contention” that is of “such a nature that it 
is capable of classwide resolution[.]”  Walmart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).  
As the Supreme Court explained in Dukes, the key 
consideration in assessing commonality is “not the 
raising of common questions—even in droves—but, 
rather, the capacity of a classwide proceeding to 
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution 
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of the litigation.”  Id. (internal citations and 
quotation omitted). 
Not surprisingly, the parties in this case ask 
different questions, and thus disagree about whether 
class proceedings will generate common answers.  
Plaintiffs present the following question which they 
claim is a capable of classwide resolution:  “whether 
Google’s alleged omissions were misleading to a 
reasonable AdWords customer.”  Plaintiffs Supp’l 
Mem. at 5-6.  Defendant, in contrast, characterizes 
the question as “whether the advertiser is entitled to 
restitution.”  Defendant’s Supp’l Mem. at 5. 
In the court’s opinion, both parties’ proposed 
questions are central to and will drive the litigation.  
Plaintiffs’ question focuses on liability; Defendant’s 
question focuses on restitution.  Defendant may be 
correct that the question of “whether the advertiser 
is entitled to restitution” will generate individual 
answers.  But because Plaintiffs present a valid 
common question, the commonality requirement is 
satisfied.  See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556 (“We quite 
agree that for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) ‘[e]ven a 
single [common] question’ will do.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted); see also Hanlon v. 
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“All questions of fact and law need not be common to 
satisfy [Rule 23].”). 
As previously noted, Plaintiffs assert a claim under 
the UCL’s “fraudulent” prong and a claim under 
California’s FAL.  For liability to attach under either 
of these statutes based on false or deceptive 
advertising, it is necessary only to show that 
members of the public are “likely to be deceived” by 
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the omissions.  See O’Shea, 2011 WL 4352458 at *3; 
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 312 n. 8, (“A 
violation of the UCL’s fraud prong is also a violation 
of the false advertising law”)).  Accordingly, a central 
inquiry in this case is “whether Google’s alleged 
omissions were misleading to a reasonable AdWords 
customer.”  This question is common to all members 
of the putative class and, when answered, will be 
dispositive of the issue of liability.  See, e.g., O’Shea, 
2011 WL 4352458 at *3.  The Court therefore holds 
that the commonality requirement set forth in 
Rule 23(a)(2) is met.  See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556. 
3. Typicality 
Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently typical to satisfy 
Rule 23(a)(3).  Under the requirement’s “permissive 
standards,” claims are typical if they are “reasonably 
co-extensive with those of absent class members; 
they need not be substantially identical.”  Hanlon v. 
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998).  
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same alleged 
omissions as do the claims of all class members:  
Google failed to disclose that, regardless of whether a 
particular AdWords customer chose to be placed in 
Google’s “Search” or “Content” network, Google 
would place their ads on parked domains and error 
pages, and charge them for clicks on those sites.  
Because Plaintiffs’ claims involve the same legal 
claim based upon the same course of events as do the 
claims of all class members, the typicality 
requirement is met here. 
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4. Adequacy 
Under Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement, 
Plaintiffs must establish that they “will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(a)(4).  In determining whether a proposed 
class representative will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class, the Court asks two 
questions.  First, do the proposed class 
representatives and their counsel “have any conflicts 
of interest with other class members”?  Staton v. 
Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020).  Second, will the proposed 
class representatives and their counsel “prosecute 
the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id. 
Defendant briefly argues that named Plaintiff 
Pulaski & Middleman has a professional relationship 
with plaintiffs counsel, Foote Meyers, which creates 
a financial entanglement that renders Pulaski & 
Middleman an inappropriate class representative.  
Opp’n at 10.  However, a close examination of Adam 
Pulaski’s deposition testimony reveals that the 
nature of the relationship was purely professional, 
involving shared work on two cases, as well as a few 
referrals which did not involve referral fees.  This 
relationship is quite different from the long-standing 
personal friendship and financial ties that the 
Eleventh Circuit found inappropriate in London v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 
2003) (plaintiff and class counsel had a very close 
friendship, class counsel had been plaintiffs stock 
broker for many years, and plaintiffs recovery would 
vastly exceed what any of the class members would 
receive).  As such, the court finds no evidence that 
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Plaintiffs or their counsel have any conflicts of 
interest with proposed class members. 
Plaintiffs’ claims, as explained with respect to the 
typicality requirement, are aligned with the claims of 
proposed class members.  Moreover, Plaintiffs are 
represented by attorneys that have significant class 
action experience–including class action experience, 
including experience in UCL actions–that are 
capable of fairly and adequately representing 
Plaintiffs and the proposed class.  Accordingly, the 
adequacy requirement is also met here. 
c. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements 
In this case, Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant 
to 23(b)(3).  Thus, to certify a class action, Plaintiffs 
must also satisfy the predominance and superiority 
requirements of that rule.  The test under Rule 
23(b)(3) evaluates whether “adjudication of common 
issues will help achieve judicial economy.”  Aho, 
2011 WL 5401799 at *9 (quoting Vinole v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 944 
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted)).  To this 
end, it requires courts to determine whether “the 
actual interests of the parties can be served best by 
settling their differences in a single action.”  Hanlon, 
150 F.3d at 1022 (internal quotations omitted).  A 
plaintiff must show more than the mere existence of 
a common question of law or fact to satisfy the 
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3); he or she 
must show that the common question of law or fact 
predominates.  Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556.  For the 
reasons explained below, Plaintiffs do not meet this 
requirement. 
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In this case, there is a common question to resolve 
the issue of liability:  whether Google’s alleged 
omissions were misleading to a reasonable AdWords 
customer.12  See supra at 18-19.  While this question 
may weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor, the court is 
unconvinced that such commonalities predominate 
over questions affecting individual members of the 
putative class.  Indeed, as mentioned above in 
Section II.B.3.a., the question of which advertisers 
among the hundreds of thousands of proposed class 
members are even entitled to restitution would 
require individual inquiries.  See Mazur, 257 F.R.D. 
at 567 (refusing to certify a class that included “non-
harmed” members); In re Flash Memory Antitrust 
Litig., No. C 07-0086 SBA, 2010 WL 2332081, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (denying certification where 
damages methodology “would . . . sweep in an 
unacceptable number of uninjured plaintiffs”). 
Another obstacle to a finding that common issues 
predominate is the individual nature of the 
restitutionary relief sought, as class members each 
paid different sums for each particular ad campaign 
and for each instance in which an ad was clicked.  
Varian Decl. at ¶ 6.  While it is often true that 
“[d]amages calculations alone . . . cannot defeat 
certification,”  Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. 
Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010), that 
                                                     
12 The court rejects Defendant’s argument that individualized 
questions of reliance and materiality must be proved here. 
Opp’n at 14-17. As previously explained, Plaintiffs’ UCL and 
FAL claims are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test, 
which requires Plaintiffs to “show that members of the public 
are likely to be deceived.”  Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 
523 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
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principle does not apply to the facts here.13  The 
amount that advertisers pay to use AdWords is 
determined through an auction process that 
generates a separate cost for each advertiser for each 
ad and for each click, with the specific amounts 
determined by the interplay of the bidding strategies 
of the participating advertisers in a given auction.  
See Opposition at 24-25.  These intricacies make it 
more difficult to calculate what AdWords customers 
would have paid “but for” the alleged misstatements 
or omissions.  For instance, “every ad placed on 
AdWords is priced differently, and the ultimate 
amount Google charges for each ad depends on 
dozens of factors that are unique to each ad 
placement, unique to each individual advertiser, and 
dependent on the unique attributes of each of the 
other advertisers who also wished to place ads on the 
particular web page at issue.”  Varian Decl. at ¶ 6.  
Furthermore, under the AdWords auction system, 
“there is no ‘set’ price per click paid by all advertisers 
that is knowable ahead of time; instead all 
advertisers pay a different price that is determined 
based on the interplay between all of the differing 
                                                     
13 In Yokoyama, the Ninth Circuit based its statement on two 
decisions that confirm that certification is inappropriate where 
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a workable method for 
calculating monetary recovery. See Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile 
Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 40 n.8 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting in its discussion 
of damages that “[c]ourts have denied class certification where 
these individual issues are especially complex or burdensome” 
(citing 5 J.W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Prac. § 23.46[2][b] at 23-
209 & n. 17)); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 
1975) (affirming certification but noting that given the 
particular facts of that case, “the process of computing 
individual damages will be virtually a mechanical task”). 
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maximum cost-per-clicks (i.e., ‘bids’) from all of the 
advertisers participating in the auction.”  Id.  This 
suggests that Plaintiffs cannot simply assume that a 
reduction in the demand for advertising on AdWords 
among some undefined group of advertisers would 
lead to a lower “but for” price for all advertisers.  See 
Rebuttal Expert Report of Randolph E. Bucklin.  
Thus, any effort to determine what advertisers 
“would have paid” under a different set of 
circumstances requires a complex and highly 
individualized analysis of advertiser behavior for 
each particular ad that was placed.  See Bucklin 
Expert Report and Rebuttal Expert Rpt. of Randolph 
E. Bucklin. 
To further complicate matters, advertisers have 
widely varying goals, which makes it difficult to 
calculate the actual value of what advertisers 
received for their payments to Google.14  See Bucklin 
Expert Report at TR 81-82.  While the advertiser 
account data maintained by Google tracks the cost of 
advertising on parked domain and error pages, it 
                                                     
14 One way to measure the performance of an online ad is 
based on “conversions.” Opp’n at 5; Alferness Decl. at ¶19. A 
conversion occurs when a user clicks on an ad, arrives at the 
advertiser’s designated web page, and completes some further 
action to the benefit of the advertiser.  Id.  In 2009, only a small 
percentage of active AdWords accounts were opted in to 
conversion tracking. Opp’n at 6 (citing Bucklin Expert Report 
(Docket Item No. 281-1) at 38). Even if all AdWords accounts 
were opted into conversion tracking, conversion rates alone may 
not be a satisfactory measure of the overall benefits achieved 
from ads placed on parked domains and error pages. See 
Bucklin Expert Report (Docket Item No. 281-1) and Rebuttal 
Expert Rpt. of Randolph E. Bucklin (Docket Item No. 281-2) 
(“Bucklin Rebuttal Report”). 
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provides limited information on the value advertisers 
receive as a result of that advertising.  Id. at 83. 
Although it is true that restitution need not be 
determined with exact precision, it “must be based 
on a specific amount found owing, and this 
measureable amount of restitution due must be 
supported by substantial evidence.”  Ewert v. eBay, 
Inc., Case Nos. C-07-02198 RMW, C-07-04487 RMW, 
2010 WL 4269259, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) 
(internal citation omitted).  The court is not 
persuaded that, in this case, with these parties and 
facts, restitution can be reliably measured using 
common methods.  Plaintiffs’ Full Refund Approach, 
Smart Pricing Approach, and the Content Pricing 
Approach do not sufficiently take into account the 
unique circumstances surrounding the AdWords 
auctions.  For example, the “Full Refund Method” 
would award full restitution of all fees paid to 
Google, without taking into account the benefits 
those members received or the fact that some 
actively sought to have their ads placed on parked 
domains and error pages.  See Expert Report of Stan 
V. Smith, Docket Item No. 228, (“Smith Report”) at 
10; See Bucklin Rebuttal Report,¶¶ 58-61.  Similarly, 
the “Smart Pricing Method” would apply a uniform 
discount for all ads placed on a parked domain — 
even if an individual advertiser’s ads on that web 
page outperformed ads appearing on other types of 
websites (as was the case for named Plaintiff RK 
West).  See Bucklin Rebuttal Report, ¶¶ 35-40.  
Along the same lines, the Content Pricing Method 
would award restitution to advertisers based on a 
blanket assumption that all ads in Google’s Search 
Network outperform ads on the Content Network, 
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despite evidence that the opposite is true in many 
cases, including the named Plaintiffs’ own 
experiences.15  See Smith Report at 63; see Bucklin 
Rebuttal Report at ¶¶ 44-57. 
Since the purpose of restitution is to return class 
members to status quo, the amount of restitution due 
must account for the benefits received from ads 
placed on parked domains and error pages.  Here, in 
many instances, individual proof would show that 
advertisers received significant revenues and other 
benefits from ads placed on parked domains and 
error pages – benefits that would need to be 
individually accounted for in any restitution 
calculation. 
Plaintiffs have not “affirmatively demonstrated” 
that restitution can be calculated by methods of 
common proof.  See Dukes, at 10.  While Plaintiffs 
present a hypothetical “but for” price for advertising 
on parked domains and error pages absent Google’s 
alleged “deception,” they overlook the reality of how 
advertising costs are actually determined in the 
AdWords system.  Where, as here, proof of 
restitution due each class member cannot be proved 
with relative ease, the court finds good reason to 
deny class certification. 
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that 
individualized issues of restitution permeate the 
class claims.  In light of such, it concludes that the 
                                                     
15  For example, named Plaintiff RK West experienced an 
average conversion rate on the Search Network (5%) that 
exceeded its performance on the Content Network (.7%). 
Bucklin Rebuttal Report ¶ 52. 
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proposed class is not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”  Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).  Plaintiff 
therefore fails to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement 
that common issues predominate.16 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES 
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.  The Court 
sets this matter for a Case Management Conference 
to be held on February 17, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.  The 
parties shall file a Joint Case Management 
Statement on or before February 10, 2012. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  January 5, 2012 
 
/s/ Edward J. Davila  
EDWARD J. DAVILA 
United States District Judge 
 
 
                                                     
16  Because the Court finds that individualized issues of 
restitution preclude satisfaction of the predominance 
requirement set forth in Rule 23(b)(3), it does not reach the 
remaining inquiry of whether the proposed class action is 
“superior” to the other methods available for adjudicating the 
controversy.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
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APPENDIX C 
_______________ 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
_______________ 
Case No.:  5: 08-CV-03369 EJD 
[Re:  Docket Item No. 316] 
_______________ 
IN RE GOOGLE, ADWORDS LITIGATION 
_______________ 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
_______________ 
On January 19, 2012, Plaintiffs requested leave to 
file a motion for reconsideration of the court’s Order 
Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class.  For the 
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 
Civil L.R. 7-9 authorizes a request to file a motion 
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order when 
the requesting party can specifically show: 
(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a 
material difference in fact or law exists from 
that which was presented to the Court before 
entry of the interlocutory order for which 
reconsideration is sought.  The party also must 
show that in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence the party applying for 
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reconsideration did not know such fact or law 
at the time of the interlocutory order; or 
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a 
change of law occurring after the time of such 
order; or 
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider 
material facts or dispositive legal arguments 
which were presented to the Court before such 
interlocutory order. 
Civil L.R. 7-9(b).  The rule specifically prohibits the 
repetition of any oral or written argument made in 
support of or in opposition to the order which the 
party now seeks to have reconsidered.  The purpose 
of a motion for reconsideration is to provide a vehicle 
for a district court to correct a manifest error without 
the need for an appeal.  It is not an opportunity to 
relitigate issues that have already been thoughtfully 
decided. 
Plaintiffs here attempt to show a “manifest failure” 
by the court to consider their arguments that 
(1) restitution awards can be calculated on a common 
basis without burdensome individualized inquiries in 
this case, (2) individual issues in calculating relief 
should not defeat class certification as a matter of 
law in any event, and (3) in the alternative, the court 
should certify a class for liability purposes only. 
The court considered and rejected both the factual 
argument that restitution could be calculated 
without individualized inquiries and the legal 
argument that a class should be certified anyway.  
See Order Denying Pls.’ Mot. Certify Class (“Order”) 
at 22-25, Jan. 5, 2012, ECF No. 315 (distinguishing 
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Yokoyama and Ewert based on the evidence 
submitted about the AdWords auction system).  The 
instant request for leave to file a motion for 
reconsideration is based upon an understandable 
misreading of the order denying class certification, so 
the court takes this opportunity to clarify any 
ambiguity. 
In the Order, the court considered whether 
restitution could be calculated on a common basis for 
all members of the proposed class.  In doing so the 
court analyzed each of Plaintiffs’ proposed 
methodologies:  the “Full Refund Method,” the 
“Smart Pricing Method,” and the “Content Pricing 
Method.”  The court observed that “the ‘Smart 
Pricing Method’ would apply a uniform discount for 
all ads placed on a parked domain — even if an 
individual advertiser’s ads on that web page 
outperformed ads appearing on other types of 
websites (as was the case for named Plaintiff RK 
West).”  Order at 24:14-17 (emphasis in original).  
Plaintiffs argue that this statement shows that the 
denial of class certification was based on the 
erroneous conclusion that calculating restitution 
requires each individual advertiser’s award to be 
offset by the amount of benefit that advertiser 
reaped from the placement of its ads. 
Plaintiffs read too much into the Order.  Plaintiffs 
are correct that the appropriate restitution recovery 
is the market value of the advertisements at the time 
of purchase (appropriately discounted for the 
allegedly undisclosed possibility of their appearance 
on error pages or parked domains) subtracted from 
the price actually paid.  But this restitution 
calculation depends on the existence of a reliable and 
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common method for calculating the discount.  The 
denial of the class certification motion was based on 
the court’s determination that none of Plaintiffs’ 
proposed methods is sufficiently reliable on a class-
wide basis.  The problem with the Smart Pricing 
Method’s uniform discount is not that it would allow 
recovery by some individual advertisers—like RK 
West—for whom the parked-domain/error-page 
placements turned out to be profitable.  Rather, the 
real problem is that there are so many advertisers 
like RK West that applying a uniform discount is too 
inexact a solution.  See Bucklin Rebuttal Report 
¶¶ 35-40.  In coming to its conclusion, the court 
considered Googie’s “admissions” about Smart 
Pricing as well as both parties’ expert reports. 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ fallback position—that a class 
should be certified for liability purposes only—is 
entirely new.  It was never raised in the memoranda 
in support of the motion for class certification, so it 
does not meet the requirement of Civil L.R. 7-9(b)(3) 
that the argument have been “presented to the Court 
before [the] interlocutory order.”  Deciding an issue 
for the first time on a motion for reconsideration 
would be procedurally improper. 
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a motion for 
reconsideration is DENIED. 
The parties shall meet, confer, and file an updated 
Joint Case Management Statement on or before May 
9, 2012.  The case management conference set for 
May 11, 2012, will proceed as scheduled. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  May 4, 2012 
 
/s/ Edward J. Davila  
EDWARD J. DAVILA 
United States District Judge 
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APPENDIX D 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No.:  12-16752 
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD 
Northern District of California, San Jose 
_______________ 
PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; et al., 
Plaintiffs – Appellants, 
v. 
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant – Appellee. 
_______________ 
ORDER 
_______________ 
Before:  TASHIMA and PAEZ, Circuit Judges and 
QUIST,* Senior District Judge.   
Google, Inc.’s motion to stay the mandate pending 
the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari is 
GRANTED.  See Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2). 
[FILED DECEMBER 21, 2015] 
                                                     
* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 
sitting by designation. 
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APPENDIX E 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No.:  12-16752 
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD 
Northern District of California, San Jose 
_______________ 
PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; et al., 
Plaintiffs – Appellants, 
v. 
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant – Appellee. 
_______________ 
ORDER 
_______________ 
Before:  TASHIMA and PAEZ, Circuit Judges and 
QUIST,* Senior District Judge.  
The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel 
rehearing. 
The full court has been advised of the petition for 
rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote 
                                                     
* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 
sitting by designation. 
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on whether to rehear the matter en banc.  
Fed. R. App. P. 35. 
The petition for panel rehearing and the petition 
for rehearing en banc are DENIED. 
[FILED DECEMBER 8, 2015] 
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APPENDIX F 
_______________ 
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED 
_______________ 
28 U.S.C. § 2072. Rules of procedure and 
evidence; power to prescribe 
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and 
rules of evidence for cases in the United States 
district courts (including proceedings before 
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such 
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such 
rules have taken effect. 
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a 
district court is final for the purposes of appeal under 
section 1291 of this title. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  Class Actions 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class 
may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
behalf of all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; 
69a 
 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be 
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against 
individual class members would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications 
with respect to individual class members that 
would establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual 
class members that, as a practical matter, 
would be dispositive of the interests of the 
other members not parties to the individual 
adjudications or would substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, 
and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy. The matters 
pertinent to these findings include: 
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(A) the class members’ interests in 
individually controlling the prosecution or 
defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by 
or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in 
the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class 
action. 
(c) Certification Order; Notice to Class 
Members; Judgment; Issues Classes; 
Subclasses. 
(1) Certification Order. 
(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable 
time after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative, the court must determine by 
order whether to certify the action as a class 
action. 
(B) Defining the Class; Appointing Class 
Counsel. An order that certifies a class action 
must define the class and the class claims, 
issues, or defenses, and must appoint class 
counsel under Rule 23(g). 
(C) Altering or Amending the Order. An 
order that grants or denies class certification 
may be altered or amended before final 
judgment. 
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(2) Notice. 
(A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class 
certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the 
court may direct appropriate notice to the 
class. 
(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to 
class members the best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort. The 
notice must clearly and concisely state in 
plain, easily understood language: 
(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an 
appearance through an attorney if the 
member so desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the 
class any member who requests 
exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting 
exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment 
on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
(3) Judgment. Whether or not favorable to the 
class, the judgment in a class action must: 
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(A) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) 
or (b)(2), include and describe those whom the 
court finds to be class members; and 
(B) for any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(3), include and specify or describe those 
to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, 
who have not requested exclusion, and whom 
the court finds to be class members. 
(4) Particular Issues. When appropriate, an 
action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues. 
(5) Subclasses. When appropriate, a class may 
be divided into subclasses that are each treated 
as a class under this rule. 
(d) Conducting the Action. 
(1) In General. In conducting an action under 
this rule, the court may issue orders that: 
(A) determine the course of proceedings or 
prescribe measures to prevent undue 
repetition or complication in presenting 
evidence or argument; 
(B) require—to protect class members and 
fairly conduct the action—giving appropriate 
notice to some or all class members of: 
(i) any step in the action; 
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; 
or 
(iii) the members’ opportunity to signify 
whether they consider the representation 
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fair and adequate, to intervene and 
present claims or defenses, or to 
otherwise come into the action; 
(C) impose conditions on the representative 
parties or on intervenors; 
(D) require that the pleadings be amended to 
eliminate allegations about representation of 
absent persons and that the action proceed 
accordingly; or 
(E) deal with similar procedural matters. 
(2) Combining and Amending Orders. An order 
under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or amended 
from time to time and may be combined with an 
order under Rule 16. 
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or 
Compromise. The claims, issues, or defenses of a 
certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, 
or compromised only with the court’s approval. The 
following procedures apply to a proposed settlement, 
voluntary dismissal, or compromise: 
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable 
manner to all class members who would be bound 
by the proposal. 
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, 
the court may approve it only after a hearing and 
on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. 
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a 
statement identifying any agreement made in 
connection with the proposal. 
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(4) If the class action was previously certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to 
approve a settlement unless it affords a new 
opportunity to request exclusion to individual 
class members who had an earlier opportunity to 
request exclusion but did not do so. 
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal 
if it requires court approval under this 
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn 
only with the court's approval. 
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may permit an 
appeal from an order granting or denying class-
action certification under this rule if a petition for 
permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk 
within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal 
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless 
the district judge or the court of appeals so orders. 
(g) Class Counsel. 
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. Unless a statute 
provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class 
must appoint class counsel. In appointing class 
counsel, the court: 
(A) must consider: 
(i) the work counsel has done in 
identifying or investigating potential 
claims in the action; 
(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class 
actions, other complex litigation, and the 
types of claims asserted in the action; 
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(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable 
law; and 
(iv) the resources that counsel will 
commit to representing the class; 
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent 
to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class; 
(C) may order potential class counsel to 
provide information on any subject pertinent 
to the appointment and to propose terms for 
attorney's fees and nontaxable costs; 
(D) may include in the appointing order 
provisions about the award of attorney’s fees 
or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and 
(E) may make further orders in connection 
with the appointment. 
(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel. 
When one applicant seeks appointment as class 
counsel, the court may appoint that applicant 
only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 
23(g)(1) and (4). If more than one adequate 
applicant seeks appointment, the court must 
appoint the applicant best able to represent the 
interests of the class. 
(3) Interim Counsel. The court may designate 
interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class 
before determining whether to certify the action 
as a class action. 
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(4) Duty of Class Counsel. Class counsel must 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of 
the class. 
(h) Attorney’s Fees and Nontaxable Costs. In a 
certified class action, the court may award 
reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that 
are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement. 
The following procedures apply: 
(1) A claim for an award must be made by 
motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the 
provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the 
court sets. Notice of the motion must be served on 
all parties and, for motions by class counsel, 
directed to class members in a reasonable 
manner. 
(2) A class member, or a party from whom 
payment is sought, may object to the motion. 
(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find 
the facts and state its legal conclusions under 
Rule 52(a). 
(4) The court may refer issues related to the 
amount of the award to a special master or a 
magistrate judge, as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D). 
